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ELECTORAL CHOICES, ETHNIC ACCOMMODATIONS,
AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF COALITIONS:
CRITIQUING THE RUNOFF CLAUSE OF THE AFGHAN
CONSTITUTION
Mohammad Bashir Mobasher*
Abstract: Article sixty-one of the Afghan Constitution requires a candidate to
win an absolute majority of votes to become the president. This constitutional rule
comprises a runoff clause, which prescribes a second round of elections between the two
front-runners should no candidate win over 50% of the votes in the first round. While
this article agrees with the majority view of Afghan scholars and politicians who see the
runoff clause as instrumental to developing trans-ethnic coalitions and governments, it
distinguishes between the formation of alliances and their consolidation. Ultimately, this
article posits that the runoff clause actually impedes the long-term success of these
coalitions. The analysis reveals that the formation of cross-ethnic coalitions under the
runoff clause does not necessarily eliminate the likelihood of ethnic tensions during or
after elections.
Having revealed some inherent flaws of the runoff clause, this article introduces
some alternatives to, and adaptations of, the runoff system, which have been adopted in
the constitutions, and electoral laws of other multiethnic states. It examines these
alternatives in light of counterfactual simulations using the last three presidential
elections. Through these observations, this article contributes to the ongoing legal and
political discourse on reforming the Constitution and the electoral laws that began with
the National Unity Government Agreement.

INTRODUCTION
Unlike the parliamentary elections that have exacerbated party
fragmentation, the presidential elections of Afghanistan have given rise to
coalitions that have transcended ethnic boundaries. 1 These emerging
* PhD student at the University of Washington School of Law. I’d like to thank Prof. Robert
Pekkanen and Prof. Elizabeth Baldwin for spending their precious time on reviewing and editing this topic
and offering invaluable insights and comments. I would also like to thank the editors of Washington
International Law Journal for their insightful comments throughout the revision process. The helpful
feedback from my dear friends Abdullah Dastageer Popalzai, Shukrullah Yamin, and Hashmat Khalil
Nadirpoor should not go unnoticed and unappreciated.
1
Andrew Reynolds & John Carey, Fixing Afghanistan’ s Electoral System: Arguments and Options
for
Reform,
AFG.
RES.
AND
EVALUATION
UNIT,
9–10
(2012),
http://www.refworld.org/docid/5003f05a2.html. Since the first parliamentary election (2005), Afghanistan
experienced an increase in the number of parties and decrease in their share of seats in the Assembly. For
example, the number of parties reached to over one hundred by the second parliamentary election (2010),
until which a reregistration of political parties was required by the new Political Party Law. At the same
time, parties’ share of seats decreased from 156 seats in 2005 to ninety-three seats in 2010. The number of
independent MPs almost doubled in 2010 (from 37.2% in 2005 to 62.4% in 2010). In 2005, the largest
party in the parliament was Hizb-Naween Afghanistan (The New Afghanistan Party), which won twenty-
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presidential coalitions have demonstrated popularity, cross-ethnic appeal,
and political accommodation by elites.2 The tradition of coalition-building
has become firmly entrenched in the presidential elections of Afghanistan.
However, despite this apparent potential for political development,
coalitions have remained weak and prone to dissolution. Most coalitions
have been built on the basis of patronage and personal politics while lacking
titles, organizational structures, and ideologies.3 Some electoral coalitions
have not even lasted long enough to witness elections. 4 Others have
dissolved immediately after elections.5 Notably, the number of coalitions is
on the rise, 6 which indicates a trend resembling party fragmentation in
Afghanistan. 7 Most importantly, although cross-ethnic coalitions have
emerged during the presidential elections, they were not able to prevent
ethnic tensions in the 2009 and 2014 elections.8

five seats (10%). The same party won only a single seat in 2010. In 2010, the largest share of seats by a
party was eighteen. The same party, Jamiat Islami (Islamic Society Party), had twenty-two seats in 2005.
2
Scholars like Thomas Rutting and Anna Larson preferred the word proto-parties for Afghan
parties since these organizations do not constitute parties in the conventional sense. See Thomas Rutting,
Islamists, Leftists – and a Void in the Center: Afghanistan's Political Parties and where they come from
(1902-2006), 1 KONRAD STIFTUNG ADENAUER (2006), http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_9674-544-2-30.pdf;
Anna Larson, Afghanistan’s New Democratic Parties: A Means To Organize Democratization? AFG. RES.
AND EVALUATION UNIT, 5 (2009) http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/49c254a02.pdf.
Thomas Rutting described proto-parties as “the parties in the making” and characterized them as the
parties that “most lack cohesion and structure, a distinguishable program, and internal democracy. Many
are extremely hierarchical or even authoritarian, often organized along ethnic lines.” These authors
describe Afghan proto-parties as not resembling parties in established and/or Western democracies, in that
they are largely based on the ethnic ex-military factions that fought in the civil war. See id.
3
Mohammad Bashir Mobasher, Understanding Ethnic-Electoral Dynamics: How Ethnic Politics
Affect Electoral Laws and Election Outcomes in Afghanistan, 51 GONZ. L. REV. 355, 364 (2016) (“The
second step [of candidates for developing cross-ethnic coalitions] is to draw the support of elites . . . by the
promises of power sharing, distribution of public funds, and other social and economic pledges.”).
4
Id. at 414. From twenty-two large coalitions, ten coalitions went through dissolution or
reformulation before elections. See infra Table I.
5
See Mobasher, supra note 3. From twenty-two large coalitions, only four coalitions were able to
survive at least partly after elections. See infra Table I.
6
See infra Table I.
7
Ministry of Justice, Registered Political Parties and Social Organizations (May 4, 2016),
http://moj.gov.af/en/page/registered-political-parties-and-social-organizations/1700. As of 2016, fifty to
fifty-seven organizations registered as political parties in the Ministry of Justice. Interestingly, the listed
number of registered parties is different from the English version (fifty parties) to Dari and Pashtu versions
(fifty-seven parties) of the Website of the Ministry of Justice.
8
Int’l Crisis Group, Afghanistan’s Political Transition, ASIA REPORT N 260, (Oct. 16, 2014),
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/260-afghanistan-s-politicaltransition.pdf; see also NAT’L DEMOCRATIC INST., POLITICAL PARTIES IN AFGHANISTAN: A REVIEW OF THE
STATE OF POLITICAL PARTIES AFTER 2009 AND 2010 ELECTIONS 28 (2011) [hereinafter NDI]; see also BEN
SMITH, HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBR., POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN (2011); see also Frud
Bezhan, Ahead Of Presidential Vote, Afghan Political Forces Divide Along Ethnic Lines, RADIO FREE
EUROPE (Nov. 15, 2015), http://www.rferl.org/content/afghan-politics-feature/25101500.html.
The
presidential elections of 2009 and 2014 have led to an almost explosive level of ethnic divide and tensions.
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This article provides a systematic analysis of the runoff clause of
Article 61 of the Afghan Constitution and its impact on the formation and
consolidation of coalitions. 9 While this article agrees with most Afghan
scholars and politicians who view the runoff clause as instrumental to
developing trans-ethnic coalitions and governments, it distinguishes between
the formation of alliances and their consolidation.10 Ultimately, this article
posits that the runoff system actually impedes the long-term success of these
coalitions primarily by encouraging patronage politics. Through this
analysis, it also reveals that the formation of cross-ethnic coalitions under
the runoff system does not necessarily eliminate the likelihood of ethnic
tensions. In light of these observations, this article proposes a revisitation of
Article 61 and the adoption of an electoral system that helps consolidate
cross-ethnic coalitions and reduces ethnic tensions. Part I of this article
focuses on how the coalitions form under the runoff rule in Afghanistan.
Part II explains how the runoff clause hinders the consolidation of coalitions
and depoliticization of ethnic issues. Finally, Part III reviews and explains
some alternative systems and regulations that have been instrumental in
instituting cross-ethnic coalitions and preventing ethnic conflict in different
divided societies.
This article contributes to the ongoing legal and political discourse on
reforming the Constitution and the electoral laws that began with the
National Unity Government Agreement. 11 This Agreement, and the
subsequent legislative decrees, which came about as the result of the
disastrous 2014 presidential election,12 proposed amending the Constitution
In both elections, the second rounds were boycotted by one of the front-runners and the threat to violence
was louder than ever. The runoff of 2014 presidential election almost brought about a civil war, if it was
not for international intervention.
9
See DAVID M. FARRELL, ELECTORAL SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION 46–47 (2d ed.
2011). The runoff clause requires two rounds of elections. Under this system of election, all candidates
compete in the first round, some of them wanting to win outright. However, if no candidate wins the
required majority (mostly, 50+1), a second round election will be held, in which only front-runners
compete.
10
This conclusion was derived from interviews with forty scholars and politicians, which included
MPs, leaders of parties and coalitions, and members of different Independent Electoral Commissions. The
interview was conducted between March 20 and June 2.
11
Agreement between the Two Campaign Teams Regarding the Structure of the National Unity
Government, L.A. TIMES, Sep. 21, 2014, http://documents.latimes.com/agreement-between-two-campaignteams-regarding-structure-national-unity-government/ [hereinafter Agreement].
12
Rob Crilly, Afghan presidential candidate rejects election 'coup' and 'plans parallel government',
THE
TELEGRAPH
(Jul.
8,
2014),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews
/asia/afghanistan/10952827/Afghan-presidential-candidate-rejects-election-coup-and-plans-parallelgovernment.html. The massive fraud in the second round of 2014 led to electoral crisis and heated ethnic
tensions. Abdullah Abdullah renounced the election result and declared his intention of forming his own
government regardless of election results. See Int’l Crisis Group, supra note 8, at 18; see also KENNETH
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and alternating electoral designs.13 Subsequent to the Agreement, however,
the legal and political discourse has predominantly focused on reforming the
parliamentary electoral system, known as the Single Non-Transferable Vote
(SNTV).14 The runoff clause attracted very few scholars’ attention.15 Even
then, the scholarship on the runoff system remained merely descriptive due
to the common perception that the runoff system encourages the
development of cross-ethnic coalitions and government.16 This issue is ripe
for examination, however, since the formation of broad-based coalitions
during the presidential elections is juxtaposed with ethnic tensions in these
elections, as well as the failure of coalitions to survive elections and their
KATZMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., AFGHANISTAN: POLITICS, ELECTIONS, AND GOVERNMENT
PERFORMANCE 28 (2015). Later, Abdullah Abdullah’s supporters gathered at the Loya Jirga (Grand
Council) hall, many of them heavily armed, shouting at him to declare a ‘parallel state’. Some of them
“allegedly made preparations to seize control of government buildings in at least three provinces and
occupy the presidential palace in Kabul.”
13
Agreement, supra note 11, Sec. E; Farman-e-Taqnini [Legis. Decree] No. 40, 1394 (2015)
[hereinafter “Farman 40”]; Farman-e-Taqnini [Legis. Decree] No. 83, 1394 (2015) [hereinafter “Farman
83”]. Complete versions of both reports are available at ELECTORAL REFORM: A REPORT ON THE STUDIES,
PERFORMANCE, RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SPECIAL ELECTORAL REFORM COMMISSION 187–213
(Asadullah Sa’adati, ed., 1395) (2016).
14
See Sayed Mahdi Munadi, Intekhabat Dar Keshwarhai Pasamunze’a wa Darshai Barai
Afghanistan [Elections in Post-Conflict Societies and the Lessons for Afghanistan], in DEMOCRACY
AFGHANI: FURSAT HA WA CHALISH HA [AFGHAN DEMOCRACY: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES] 41–60
(Mohammad Nabi Ahmadi & Majid Ismaelzada eds., 1393) [2014]; Sarwar Danish, Anwa Nezamhai
Intekhabati; Chegonagi Tarahi, Mazaya wa Ma’ayeb [Kinds of Electoral Systems, Their Designing,
Advantages and Disadvantages], in ANDISHA MOASER, FASELNAMA WEZHA INTEKHABAT [SPECIAL FOR
ELECTIONS QUARTERLY] 49–52 (1394) [2015]; Mohammad Qasem Urfani, Negahi Muqayesa’ee Ba Nezam
Hai Intekhabati [A Comparative Perspective of Electoral Systems], in ANDISHA MOASER, FASELNAMA
WEZHA INTEKHABAT [SPECIAL FOR ELECTIONS QUARTERLY] 81–99 (1394) [2015]; Mohammad Ishaq Arefi,
Mutanaseb Sazi Nezam Intekhabati Ba Arzesh Hai Qanoon Asasi Wa Waziat Chand Qawmi [Complying
the Electoral Systems to the Values of the Constitution and Multiethnic Context of Afghanistan], in
ANDISHA MOASER, FASELNAMA WEZHA INTEKHABAT [SPECIAL FOR ELECTIONS QUARTERLY] 125–139
(1394) [2015]; Mohammad Sarwar Jawadi, Zafha Wa Ma’ayeb System Intekhabati Afghanistan [The
Disadvantages of Afghanistan’s Electoral System], in ANDISHA MOASER, FASELNAMA WEZHA INTEKHABAT
[SPECIAL FOR ELECTIONS QUARTERLY] 101–123 (1394) [2015]; Qasem Ali Sedaqat, Marzbandi Hawza Hai
Intekhabati Dar Afghanistan [Districting Measures in Afghanistan], in DEMOCRACY AFGHANI: FURSAT HA
WA CHALISH HA [AFGHAN DEMOCRACY: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES] 113–134 (Mohammad Nabi
Ahmadi and Majid Ismaelzada eds., 1393) [2014]; ASADULLAH SA’ADATI, ET. AL., ELECTORAL REFORM: A
REPORT ON THE STUDIES, PERFORMANCE, RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SPECIAL ELECTORAL REFORM
COMMISSION (Asadullah Sa’adati ed., 1395) [2016]; ANNA LARSON, UNITED STATES INST. OF PEACE,
POLITICAL PARTIES IN AFGHANISTAN 3 (2015).
15
See MOHAMMAD ASHRAF RASULY, TAHLIL WA NAQD QANOON-E-ASASI AFGHANISTAN [A CRITIC
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN] 75 (1389) [2010]; MOHAMMAD TAHIR HASHEMI, HUQOOQ ASASI
WA NEHADHAI SIASI [THE CONSTITUTION AND THE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS] 143 (1387) [2007]; see also
JAWAD TAQI-ZADA, INTEKHABAT RIASAT JAMHURI DAR QANOON ASASI AFGHANISTAN [PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS IN THE CONSTITUTION], in SALNAMAH MOTAL’AT HOQUQY AFGHANISTAN [YEARBOOK OF
AFGHAN LEGAL STUDIES] 170–182 (1394) [2016] (Jawad Taqi-zada has been the only author who
explained the technicalities of the system in full depth, based on a comparative analysis of the system in
Afghanistan, Iran, and France).
16
See supra note 10.
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aftermath. This article is the first attempt to expose that juxtaposition,
suggesting that the runoff clause should be amended or replaced.
I.
THE RUNOFF CLAUSE
COALITIONS

AND THE

FORMATION

OF

CROSS-ETHNIC

Article 61 of the Afghan Constitution requires a candidate to win an
absolute majority of votes in an election to become the president. 17 It
includes a runoff clause, which provides that, “[i]f in the first round none of
the candidates gets more than fifty percent of the votes, elections for the
second round shall be held . . . and, in this round, only two candidates who
have received the highest number of votes in the first round shall
participate.” 18 The electoral framework this clause sets for presidential
elections is also known as run-off system, 19 majority-runoff, 20 delayed
runoff, 21 contingent runoff, 22 two ballots, 23 second ballot, 24 double-ballot
(DB), 25 double-ballot runoff,26 or two-round system27 in electoral studies.28
17

QANUN ASSASSI JUMHURI ISLAMAI AFGHANISTAN [CONSTITUTION], art. 61 (Jan. 26, 2004) (Afg.),
http://www.afghanembassy.com.pl/afg/images/pliki/TheConstitution.pdf.
18
Id.
19
Massimo Bordignon, Tommaso Nannicini & Guido Tabellini, Moderating Political Extremism:
Single Round vs. Runoff Elections under Plurality Rule, 1 (Inst. for the Study of Labor, Discussion Paper
No. 7561) (2013); Karine Van Der Straeten et al., Sorting Out Mechanical and Psychological Effects in
Candidate Elections: An Appraisal with Experimental Data (2013) (Working Paper, S. 12-296).
20
Pippa Norris, Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportional, Majoritarian and Mixed Systems, INT’L
POL. SCI. REV. 4 (1997); FARRELL, supra note 9, at 46–47.
21
RACHEL LEWIS ET AL., MAJORITY RULE IN INTERNATIONAL PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS: THE
DOMINANT ROLE OF RUNOFFS AROUND THE WORLD 2 (2006).
22
Id.
23
FARRELL, supra note 9, at 45
24
ENID LAKEMAN & JAMES D. LAMBERT, VOTING IN DEMOCRACIES: A STUDY OF MAJORITY AND
PROPORTIONAL ELECTORAL SYSTEMS 53 (1959); Norris, supra note 20, at 3.
25
Giovanni Sartori, The Party Effects of Electoral Systems, in POLITICAL PARTIES AND DEMOCRACY
95 (Larry Diamond and Richard Gunther eds., 2001); Thomas Fujiwara, A Regression Discontinuity Test of
Strategic Voting and Duverger’s Law, 6 Q. J. POL. SCI. 197, 203 (2011).
26
GIOVANNI SARTORI, PARTIES AND PARTY SYSTEMS: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 139 (1976).
27
John C. Courtney, Plurality-Majority Electoral Systems: A Review, 13 (Advisory Comm. of
Registered
Political
Parties,
Presentation
Paper)
(1999),
http://www.elections.ca/res/rec/fra/sys/courtney_e.pdf.
28
See DOUGLAS W. RAE, THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ELECTORAL LAWS 107 (1967) (runoff
rule is commonly classified as a majoritarian rule); FARRELL, supra note 9, at 45; Sartori, supra note 25, at
95.
However, not all types of runoff are majoritarian. In fact, constitutional designers have adopted
three different variations of the runoff rules in different countries: (a) majority-runoff, which is the most
popular runoff system, requires a threshold of 50% in the first round; (b) qualified-runoff, which is adopted
for presidential elections in some Southern American countries including Nicaragua and Costa Rica,
requires a threshold below 50% for the first round; and (c) plurality runoff, which is popularly used for
parliamentary elections, requires a very low threshold for winning the first round. For instance, in France
the threshold is merely 12.5% while in Magnolia it is 25%. For the threshold in Nicaragua, see LAS
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Today, the runoff system is a common electoral design for
presidential elections. 29 Most countries with elected presidents require a
second round election between the top two candidates.30 From seventy-two
countries with presidential constitutions, forty countries use the runoff
system for electing their presidents.31 The popular purpose for adopting this
electoral system has been to consolidate support behind the most viable
candidate and encourage development of broad-based coalitions.32
Similarly, perhaps the reason for adopting this electoral system in the
Constitution of Afghanistan was that presidential candidates must be able to
appeal to voters across ethnic groups. Assuming election results reflect
ethnic headcounts, as indicated by Donald Horowitz in Ethnic Groups in
Conflict, 33 the fifty percent threshold encourages cross-ethnic alliances in
Afghanistan.34 This is because none of the ethnic groups alone can deliver
fifty percent of the votes.35 Based on the most cited estimation, the largest
ethnic group, Pashtuns, represents forty-two percent of the population. 36
The next three largest groups—Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks—are estimated
to form between nine to thirty percent of Afghan population each. 37
CONSTITUCIONES DE NICARAGUA [THE CONSTITUTION OF NICARAGUA], Jan. 1, 1987, art. 147 (1),
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Nicaragua_2005.pdf. For Costa Rica, see CONSTITUCIÓN
POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE COSTA RICA [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF COSTA RICA], Nov.
7, 1949, art. 139, http://www.parliament.am/library/sahmanadrutyunner/kostarika.pdf. For details about
each type of runoff systems, see André Blais & Peter Loewen, The French Electoral System and its Effects,
32 WEST EUROPE POLITICS 345, 345 (2009); ANDREW REYNOLDS, BENJAMIN REILLY & ANDREW ELLIS,
ELECTORAL SYSTEM DESIGN: THE NEW INTERNATIONAL IDEA HANDBOOK 27 (2008).
29
FARRELL, supra note 9, at 45; Bordignon Nannicinni & Tabellini, supra note 19, at 1; Laurent
Bouton and Gabriele Gratton, Majority runoff elections: strategic voting and Duverger’s hypothesis, 10
THEORETICAL ECONOMICS 283, 284 (2015).
30
Juan J. Linz, The Perils of Presidentialism, 1 J. DEMOCRACY 51, 57 (1990).
31
See Comparative Data, Electoral Systems: Presidents, THE ELECTORAL KNOWLEDGE NETWORK,
https://aceproject.org/aceen/topics/es/esd/esd01/esd01e/default (last visited Jul. 3, 2016).
This system has been preferred for presidential elections because the assumption is that the first
person in the country should be chosen by at least a majority of the citizens. Some scholars, however,
challenge this assumption, suggesting that not all citizens turn out to vote in the elections and thus
technically this system does not represent a majority of citizens. See FARRELL, supra note 9, at 48–49.
32
Norris, supra note 20, at 4.
33
DONALD L. HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT, 196 (2d ed. 2001).
34
See Mobasher, supra note 3, at 363.
35
See id.
36
WORLD
FACTBOOK:
AFGHANISTAN,
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworldfactbook/geos/print/country/countrypdf_af (last visited
Jan. 8, 2016). This estimation has been used by UN agencies, NATO forces, and many national and
international organizations including some working on elections in Afghanistan.
37
Since there have not been any official estimations, different estimations of Afghan ethnic groups
have been provided by different sources and authors. It is likely that ethnic identities of some Afghan
authors have influenced their choices of estimations. See, e.g., id. at 3 (estimates that Tajiks make up 27%,
Hazaras 9%, and Uzbeks 9%); THOMAS BARFIELD, AFGHANISTAN: A CULTURAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY
26 (2010) (estimating that Pashtuns make up 40%, Tajiks 30%, Hazaras 15%, and Uzbeks with Turkmens
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Assuming these disputed estimations are accurate, this ethnic distribution is
optimal for ethnic accommodations and continuity of democracy; and, in
terms of building cross-ethnic coalitions, it corresponds well with the fifty
percent threshold. 38 As such, the runoff system renders what Donald
Horowitz and Benjamin Reilly expect from an electoral system in a divided
society: making candidates reciprocally dependent on the votes of ethnic
groups other than their own.39
Most studies have associated the runoff system with the formation of
broad-based coalitions. 40 Maurice Duverger stated that “in all countries
where the second ballot has been working there are more or less clear traces
of electoral alliances.” 41 This system became appealing to constitutional
designers across the world when it transformed the fragmented party system
of France into two political blocs.42 Indeed, the fourth republic of France
adopted a runoff system in order to prevent party-hopping 43 and cabinet
instability. 44 While explaining the runoff system in France, Robert Elgie
posited that “this system punishes stand-alone parties [and] or groups.” 45
Hence, it is no wonder that in Afghanistan, instead of relying on “proto
parties,” presidential candidates tend to form broader formal or informal
about 10% of the population in Afghanistan); Muhammad Saleem Mazhar et al., Ethnic Factor in
Afghanistan, 19 J. POL. STUDIES 98 (2012) (positing Pashtuns are 50% to 54%, Tajiks 26% to 30%,
Hazaras 7%, and Uzbeks 8%); Nahid Suleman, Ethnic Discrimination in Afghanistan, INTERMEDIA, 2,
http://www.intermedia.org.pk/pdf/pak_afghan/Naheed_Soleman_Ethnic_Discrimination_in_Afghanistan.p
df (estimating that Pashtuns make up 38%, Tajiks 25%, Hazaras 19%, Uzbeks 6%, and others 12%);
Zaman Stanizai, From Identity Crisis to Identity in Crisis in Afghanistan, THE MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE 3
(2009) (suggesting that Pashtuns make up 60% and Tajiks 12% of the population in Afghanistan).
38
For the optimality of ethnic distributions for consolidation of democracy in different societies,
refer to AREND LIJPHART, DEMOCRCY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES: A COMPARATIVE EXPLORATION, 55–61
(1977); see also BENJAMIN REILLY, DEMOCRACY AND DIVERSITY 64 (2006).
39
See HOROWITZ, supra note 33, at 647–49; BENJAMIN REILLY, DEMOCRACY IN DIVIDED SOCIETIES:
ELECTORAL ENGINEERING FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 10 (2001).
40
See MAURICE DUVERGER, POLITICAL PARTIES 328 (1954); André Blais & Indridi H. Indridason,
Making Candidates Count: The Logic of Electoral Alliances in Two-Round Legislative Elections, 69 J. OF
POL., 193, 193–94 (2007); Courtney, supra note 27, at 13; Lise Rakner & Nicolas Walle, Opposition
Weakness in Africa: Democratization by Elections? 20 J. OF DEMOCRACY 108, 116 (2009).
41
DUVERGER, supra note 40, at 328.
42
MATTHEW SOBERG SHUGART & JOHN M. CAREY, PRESIDENTS AND ASSEMBLIES: CONSTITUTIONAL
DESIGN AND ELECTORAL DYNAMICS 213 (1992).
43
See Vicky Randall, Party Regulation in Conflict-Prone Societies: More Dangers than
Opportunities, in POLITICAL PARTIES IN CONFLICT-PRONE SOCIETIES: REGULATION, ENGINEERING AND
DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT, 245 (Benjamin Reilly and Per Nordlund, eds., 2008) (used by some scholars
to mean party fragmentation).
44
Although some political scientists posed a question about whether the use of the runoff rule in
France’s parliamentary elections or presidential elections should be given the credit for government
stability, see SHUGART & CAREY, supra note 42, at 214–15; see also RAE, supra note 28, at 109.
45
Robert Elgie, France: Stacking the Deck, in THE POLITICS OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS 126 (Michael
Gallagher & Paul Mitchell, eds., 2009).

420

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 26 NO. 3

coalitions. The fact that most cross-ethnic coalitions are developed in
preparation for presidential election and not parliamentary election indicates
this advantage of the runoff system in Afghanistan.46 According to Table I,
sixteen coalitions were formed before the presidential elections, and three
coalitions before the parliamentary elections.
Table I. This table shows the number of coalitions that are
formed prior to elections or some important events, such as the
Emergency Loya Jirga (Grand Council), which elected a
temporary president, and the Constitutional Loya Jirga.47

46

This table includes only those coalitions that have either officially announced their existence and
objectives or have been popular information coalitions and have been formed for winning the elections.
Otherwise, presumably all candidates form their own small and large (mostly informal) coalitions.
47
Who is Who, AFGHAN BIOGRAPHY, http://www.afghan-bios.info/index.php?option=com_afghan
bios&id=3438&task=view&total=3261&start=664&Itemid=2 (last visited Nov. 28, 2015); Thomas
Rutting, On Your Marks! Alliances And Actors Before The 2014 Presidential Election, AFGHANISTAN
ANALYSTS NETWORK 15 (Sep. 17, 2013), https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/on-your-marks-alliancesand-actors-before-the-2014-presidential-election/; ICSD, supra note 8, at 5; Bezhan, supra note 8; NDI,
supra note 8, at 5; INT’L CRISIS GROUP, Policy Briefing 141: Afghanistan’s Parties In Transition 5 (June,
2013),
https://www.google.com/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF8#q=Afghanistan%E2%80%99s+Parties+in+Transition%2Fpdf; REVIEW TRIBUNAL, Background Paper:
Afghanistan:
Political
Parties
and
Insurgent
Groups
2001-2013,
5
(2013),
https://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1369733768_ppig2.pdf [hereinafter TRIBUNAL 2013]; Jackson
Keith, Backgrounder: The Formation Of Electoral Alliances In Afghan Politics In 2014, INST. FOR THE
STUDY OF WAR, 5 (2013); Thomas Rutting, Ambiguity Reiterated: The 20-Parties' 'Democracy Charter,
AFGHANISTAN ANALYST NETWORK (Sep. 26, 2012), https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/ambiguityreiterated-the-20-parties-democracy-charter/.
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It bears mentioning that none of the coalitions that have been formed
between the 2014 presidential election and the possible 2017 parliamentary
election have declared winning parliamentary seats as their objective. On
the contrary, the New National Front of Afghanistan (NNF), which was
formed in 2016, declared its intention of replacing the incumbents in the
government in the next election.48 Likewise, the Council for Protection and
Stability of Afghanistan (APSC) has demanded that the country amend the
Constitution by holding Constitutional Loya Jirga. 49 The alliance also
demanded the resignation of the Unity Government after the Loya Jirga

48

“Afghanistan’s New National Front” Announces Existence, ATN NEWS (Jan. 14, 2016),
http://ariananews.af/latest-news/afghanistans-new-national-front-announces-existence/.
49
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN Jan. 26, 2004, art. 110–111
(Afg.). Constitutional Loya Jirga [Loya Jirga Qanon-e-Asasi] is the grand council that amends the
Constitution. This council includes members of the parliament as well as the presidents of provincial and
district councils.
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since the government was formed through a compromise rather than a fair
election.”50
Furthermore, the interaction of the runoff clause with the regime type,
which is the presidential system in Afghanistan, advances its effect on
building cross-ethnic coalitions. 51 Presidential elections, unlike most
parliamentary elections, require pre-electoral (proactive) coalition building.52
The advantage that pre-electoral coalitions have is that they are more
amenable to cross-ethnic votes and alliances, especially since candidates and
voters do not have perfect information about the viability of candidates and
the optimal size of winning coalitions.53 Unlike conventional wisdom in the
literature, which suggests that the existence of perfect information is
important for strategic coordination, the absence of such information urges
serious presidential candidates to make broader rather than minimal winning
coalitions.54 Hence, while a threshold of fifty percent by the runoff system
can allow a minimal coalition of two or three ethnic groups, the incertitude
that the nature of presidential elections exerts pushes for a far broader
coalition.
50

See Tariq Majidi, Ahadi Launches New Party, Says NUG Has Failed, TOLONEWS, Jan. 2016,
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/content/new-national-front-afghanistan-opposition-party-launched; Mir
Abed Joenda, Elam Amadaqi Shurai Herasat wa Subat Afghanistan Bar Barguzari Loya Jirga [The
Council for Protection and Stability of Afghanistan Declares Readiness for Holding Loya Jirga]
TOLONEWS, (2016), http://www.tolonews.com/fa/afghanistan/23253-new-council-pushes-government-toconvene-jirga-before-august; also see Daudzai: Namitawan Hukumat Maslahati Ra Madamul-Umur Qabol
Kard [Daudzai: We Cannot Accept A Compromised Government to Stay Forever] RADIO AZADI, Sar. 8,
1395 (2016), http://da.azadiradio.com/a/27825262.html.
51
The presidential regime was adopted by Chapter Three of the Constitution. See THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN, art. 60–70 (Jan. 26, 2004).
52
Scott Mainwaring & Matthew S. Shugart, Juan Linz, Presidentialism, and Democracy: A Critical
Appraisal, 4/29 COMP. POL., 449, 466 (1997); see also Danielle Resnick, Do electoral coalitions facilitate
democratic consolidation in Africa?, 5/19 PARTY POLITICS 735, 740 (2011). In parliamentary elections, the
electoral system determines whether a pre-electoral or post-electoral coalition is feasible. “In legislative
elections, proportional representation (PR) systems are considered less likely to encourage pre-electoral
coalitions because votes are not necessarily wasted in the traditional sense. Exceptions, however, can occur
if threshold levels for gaining representation are relatively high, such as Mozambique’s former 5 percent
threshold level.”
53
Donald Horowitz, Constitutional Design: Proposals versus Processes, in THE ARCHITECTURE OF
DEMOCRACY: CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, AND DEMOCRACY (Andrew Reynolds,
ed., 2002); see also Gregory P. Magarian, Regulating Political Parties under a "Public Rights" First
Amendment, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1939, 1964 (2003) (another advantage of pre electoral coalition
building in the long run is that it, “by definition, reflects a choice to air strong political differences at the
stage of party formation, rather than allowing those differences to invade the electoral and policymaking
processes.”).
54
GARY W. COX, MAKING VOTES COUNT, STRATEGIC COORDINATION IN WORLD’S ELECTORAL
SYSTEMS, 79 (1997); ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY, at 7 (1957); see also
JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THE THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 8–9
(3d ed. 1953).

June 2017

Electoral Choices, Ethnic Accommodations

423

One other constitutional rule that has built on the majoritarian effect
of the runoff system is Article 60 of the Constitution, which is also reflected
in Article 45 of the Election Law.55 Article 60 requires each presidential
candidate to introduce two vice presidential candidates prior to election.56 In
order to appeal to voters across ethnic lines, in all three presidential
elections, the leading candidates have shown great incentives to choose their
first and second vice presidents from two different ethnic groups.57 In fact,
calling the elections merely a race between presidential candidates is not
entirely accurate since, based on Article 60 of the Constitution, the
presidential and vice presidential candidates campaign together, compiling
votes from their respective constituencies. 58 At times vice presidential
candidates have contributed more votes per capita—or an equal proportion
of votes—from their constituencies to their ticket than their presidential
mates.59 The following Table shows the composition of presidential teams
in the last three elections.
Table II. For the 2004 and 2009 elections, this table shows the
composition of leading presidential tickets. For 2014, the table
shows the composition of all candidates.60

55

QANUN INTEKHABAT [ELECTION LAW] 15/5/1392 [Jun. 8, 2014,] S. 1112, art. 45 (Afg.).
56
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN, art. 60 (Jan. 26, 2004);
see also ELECTION LAW, Jun. 8, 2014, S. 1112, art. 45.
57
Although presidential tickets have shown cross-ethnic votes and accommodations, there are some
issues with these ticket compositions. Mainly, the last three presidential elections demonstrated that the
composition of presidential teams represented only the largest ethnic groups. Likely, presidential
candidates chose running mates from the four larger ethnic groups because those candidates would draw
greater numbers of ethnically motivated support. As Table I shows, other smaller size ethnic groups have
remained unrepresented in presidential teams.
58
The article states that, “[t]he President shall have two Vice Presidents, first and second. The
Presidential candidate shall declare to the nation names of both vice presidential running mates.” See THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN, art. 60 (Jan. 26, 2004).
59
See Mobasher, supra note 3, at 402–409.
60
The 2004 Presidential Election Results, INDEPENDENT ELECTION COMMISSION OF AFGHANISTAN,
http://www.iec.org.af/public_html/Election%20Results%20Website/english/english.htm (last visited May
2, 2015) [hereinafter “IEC 2004”]; The 2009 Presidential Election Results, INDEPENDENT ELECTION
COMMISSION OF AFGHANISTAN, http://www.iec.org.af/results_2009/leadingCandidate.html (last visited
May 2, 2016) [hereinafter “IEC 2009”]; The 2014 Presidential Election Results, INDEPENDENT ELECTION
COMMISSION OF AFGHANISTAN, http://www.iec.org.af/pdf/finallist13/presidential.pdf (last visited Jan. 15,
2016) [hereinafter “IEC 2014”]; AFGHAN BIO, supra note 50; Biographies Of Afghan Personalities Of
Yesterday And Today, AFGHANISTAN ONLINE, http://www.afghan-web.com/bios/; Afghanistan’s
Presidential Elections: Power to the People, or the Powerful?, INT'L COUNCIL ON SECURITY AND DEV. 11–
17 (Mar. 2009), http://www.nps.edu/programs/ccs/Elections/ICOS_elections.pdf [hereinafter, “ICOS”];
Tarkib Mawenan Namzedhai Intekhabat [The Composition of Vice-President Candidate], BBC,
http://www.bbc.com/persian/afghanistan/2009/07/090630_a-af-election-vice-president-candidates.shtml;
Asia: Afghanistan Presidential Candidates 2014, GLOBAL VOICE (Mar. 27, 2014), https://iwpr.net/globalvoices/afghan-presidential-candidates-2014.
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Ethnic Composition of Presidential Teams
Candidate
Ethnicity
Ethnicity
Ethnicity
Ethnicity

Hamid Karzai
Ahmad Zia Masoud
Mohammad Karim Khalili
Independent
Pashtun
Tajik
Hazara
Mohammad Yunos Qanuni Taj Mohammad Wardak Sayyed Hosayn Alemi Balkhi
Coalition
Tajik
Pashtun
Hazara
Mohammad Mohaqiq
Nasir Ahmad Ensaf
Abdul Fayaz Mehrayin
Independent
Hazara
Pashtun
Tajik
Abdul Rashid Dostum
Shafiqa Habibi
Mustafa Kamal Makhdom
Party
Uzbek
Pashtun
Tajik

Candidate
Ethnicity
Ethnicity
Ethnicity

Ethnicity
Ethnicity
Ethnicity
Ethnicity
Ethnicity
Ethnicity
Ethnicity
Ethnicity
Ethnicity
Ethnicity

Dr. Abdullah Abdullah
Tajik*
Ashraf Ghani
Pashtun
Zalmai Rasoul
Pashtun
Abdulrab Rasul Sayaf
Pashtun

55.40%
16.30%
11.70%
10.00%

The Presidential Election of 2009: Leading Candidates
1st Vice-President 2nd Vice-President Affiliations Total Votes

Hamid Karzai
Mohammad Qasim Fahim Mohammad Karim Khalili
Pashtun
Tajik
Hazara
Dr. Abdullah Abdullah
Homayon Shah Asefi
Churagh Ali Ghuragh
Tajik (Mixed)
Pashtun
Hazara
Ramazan Bashardost Mohammad Mosa Barekzai
Afifa Marof
Hazara
Pashtun
Tajik

Candidate
Ethnicity

The Presidential Election of 2004: Leading Candidates
1st Vice-President 2nd Vice-President Affiliations Total Votes

Independent

49.67%

Independent

30.59%

Independent

10.46%

The Presidential Election of 2014: All Candidates
1st Vice-President 2nd Vice-President Affiliations Total Votes
Eng Muhammad Khan
Haji Mohaqeq
Party
Pashtun
Hazara
Gen Abdulrashid Dostum Mohammad Sarwar Danish
Independent
Uzbek
Hazara
Ahmad Zia Masoud
Habiba Sorabi
Independent
Tajik
Hazara
Ismail Khan
Abdul Wahab Erfan
Independent
Tajik
Uzbek

Qutbuddin Helal
Enayatullah Enayat
Mohammad Ali Nabizada
Pashtun
Uzbek
Tajik
Gul Agha Sherzai
Sayyed Hussain Alemi BalkhiMohammad Hashem Zare
Pashtun
Hazara
Uzbek
Daud Sultanzoy
Farid Ahmad Fazli
Ms. Kazima Mohaqeq
Pashtun
Tajik
Hazara
Hedayat Amin Arsala
General Khodaidad
Ms. Safia Sediqi
Pashtun
Hazara
Pashtun
Abdul Rahim Wardak
Shah Abdul Ahad Afzali
Sayed Hussian Anwari
Pashtun
Tajik
Hazara
Abdul Qayom Karzai
Wahidullah Shahrani
Mohammad Noor Akbari
Pashtun
Uzbek
Hazara
Sardar Mo'd Naeem
Taj Mohammad Akbar
Azizullah Puya
Pashtun
Tajik
Pashtun

45.00%
31.56%
11.37%
7.04%

Independent

2.75%

Independent

1.57%

Independent

0.46%

Independent

0.23%

Independent

Withdrew

Independent

Withdrew

Independent

Withdrew
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Ethnic Composition of Presidential Teams
Candidate

The Presidential Election of 2004: Leading Candidates
1st Vice-President 2nd Vice-President Affiliations Total Votes

Hamid Karzai
Ahmad Zia Masoud
Pashtun
Tajik
Mohammad Yunos Qanuni Taj Mohammad Wardak
Ethnicity
Tajik
Pashtun
Mohammad Mohaqiq
Nasir Ahmad Ensaf
Ethnicity
Hazara
Pashtun
Abdul Rashid Dostum
Shafiqa Habibi
Ethnicity
Uzbek
Pashtun
Ethnicity

Candidate
Ethnicity
Ethnicity
Ethnicity

Ethnicity
Ethnicity
Ethnicity
Ethnicity
Ethnicity
Ethnicity
Ethnicity
Ethnicity
Ethnicity
Ethnicity

Dr. Abdullah Abdullah
Tajik*
Ashraf Ghani
Pashtun
Zalmai Rasoul
Pashtun
Abdulrab Rasul Sayaf
Pashtun

55.40%
16.30%
11.70%
10.00%

The Presidential Election of 2009: Leading Candidates
1st Vice-President 2nd Vice-President Affiliations Total Votes

Hamid Karzai
Mohammad Qasim Fahim Mohammad Karim Khalili
Pashtun
Tajik
Hazara
Dr. Abdullah Abdullah
Homayon Shah Asefi
Churagh Ali Ghuragh
Tajik (Mixed)
Pashtun
Hazara
Ramazan Bashardost
Mohammad Mosa Barekzai
Afifa Marof
Hazara
Pashtun
Tajik

Candidate
Ethnicity

Mohammad Karim Khalili
Independent
Hazara
Sayyed Hosayn Alemi Balkhi
Coalition
Hazara
Abdul Fayaz Mehrayin
Independent
Tajik
Mustafa Kamal Makhdom
Party
Tajik

Independent

49.67%

Independent

30.59%

Independent

10.46%

The Presidential Election of 2014: All Candidates
1st Vice-President 2nd Vice-President Affiliations Total Votes
Eng Muhammad Khan
Haji Mohaqeq
Pashtun
Hazara
Gen Abdulrashid Dostum Mohammad Sarwar Danish
Uzbek
Hazara
Ahmad Zia Masoud
Habiba Sorabi
Tajik
Hazara
Ismail Khan
Abdul Wahab Erfan
Tajik
Uzbek

Qutbuddin Helal
Enayatullah Enayat
Mohammad Ali Nabizada
Pashtun
Uzbek
Tajik
Gul Agha Sherzai
Sayyed Hussain Alemi BalkhiMohammad Hashem Zare
Pashtun
Hazara
Uzbek
Daud Sultanzoy
Farid Ahmad Fazli
Ms. Kazima Mohaqeq
Pashtun
Tajik
Hazara
Hedayat Amin Arsala
General Khodaidad
Ms. Safia Sediqi
Pashtun
Hazara
Pashtun
Abdul Rahim Wardak
Shah Abdul Ahad Afzali
Sayed Hussian Anwari
Pashtun
Tajik
Hazara
Abdul Qayom Karzai
Wahidullah Shahrani
Mohammad Noor Akbari
Pashtun
Uzbek
Hazara
Sardar Mo'd Naeem
Taj Mohammad Akbar
Azizullah Puya
Pashtun
Tajik
Pashtun

Party

45.00%

Independent

31.56%

Independent

11.37%

Independent

7.04%

Independent

2.75%

Independent

1.57%

Independent

0.46%

Independent

0.23%

Independent

Withdrew

Independent

Withdrew

Independent

Withdrew

The runoff system has centripetal effects61 on both voters and elites.62
On the voter level, the runoff system encourages them to make a more
informed choice in the second round63 since the voters’ freedom of choice is
61

Centripetal effects are the political effects that indicate political moderation and cross-ethnic
appealing rather than political or social polarization. See REILLY, supra note 39, at 5–7.
62
Elgie, supra note 45, at 128; FARRELL, supra note 9, at 56, 60; Juan J. Linz, Presidential or
Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?, in THE FAILURE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY 21
(Juan J. Linz & Arturo Valenzuela eds., 1992) (under a runoff system “those [candidates] tending more
toward the extremes are aware of the limits of their strength.”)
63
GIOVANNI SARTORI, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING: AN INQUIRY INTO
STRUCTURES, INCENTIVES, AND OUTCOMES 64 (1997); Sarah Birch, Two-Round Electoral Systems and
Democracy, 36 COMP. POL. STUD. 319, 327 (2003).
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restricted to front-running candidates.64 Many voters do not have their own
ethnic candidates in the second round. In effect, the voters have an
opportunity to make a more politically informed choice, considering the
policies and merits of the candidates. Highlighting voters’ behavior,
Giovanni Sartori described the runoff system as a two-shots system.65 With
the first shot, a voter shoots pretty much in the dark; on the second shot,
however, the voter shoots in full daylight.66 André Blais and coauthors, after
arranging several experimental elections under a runoff system, concluded
that extremist candidates have a zero percent chance of winning under
majority-runoff. 67 On the elites level, two-round elections create the
potential for diverse interests to coalesce behind qualifying candidates in the
second round.68 Eliminated candidates and parties have an opportunity to
rally behind one front-runner or the other.69 Since moderate candidates are
likely to have more coalitional appealing than their extremist counterparts,
they are more likely to win the second round. Examining runoffs in a
number of countries, it appears that nowhere has the runoff rule led to
extremist candidates winning, although political outsiders have been able to
win the office.70
While extremist candidates have not been able to win elections under
a runoff system, this system does not eliminate the possibility that extremist
candidates will make it onto the second ballot. The extremist candidates
advance to the second round either because there are more moderate
candidates, who split centrist votes,71 or because moderates are squeezed by
the left and right candidates, and therefore excluded from the second
round.72 The Fair Vote Report describes how in Peru (2006) and in France
(2002) the multiplicity of candidates led to radical candidates getting to the
second round.73 For example, in the first round of 2006 election in Peru, the
64

Sartori, supra note 26, at 63; Sartori, supra note 25, at 99.
Sartori, supra note 25, at 98.
66
See id. at 98.
67
André Blais et al., One-round vs. Two-round Elections: An Experimental Study, 5 FRENCH POL.
278, 284 (2007).
68
See IDEA, supra note 28, at 53; Courtney, supra note 27, at 13.
69
See Courtney, supra note 27, at 13.
70
Although extremist candidates could be political outsiders, political outsiders are not necessarily
extremists. Political outsiders are primarily referred to as candidates who distinguish themselves from
party politics. See ANDREW E. BUSCH, OUTSIDERS AND OPENNESS: IN THE PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATING
SYSTEM, 22-26, 170–171 (1997). Therefore, political outsiders might be anti-establishment, but not
necessarily anti-system or anti-institutions.
71
See LEWIS, supra note 21, at 5.
72
Bouton & Gratton, supra note 29, at 286.
73
See LEWIS, supra note 21, at 5–6.
65
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nationalist Ollanta Humala (30.7%) was far ahead of Alan Garcia (24.3%), a
moderate candidate, since the moderate votes were split between Alan
Garcia and Lordes Flores as well as others.74 Also, in the 2002 presidential
election of France, Le Pen, an anti-immigration candidate, was able to finish
second because the votes of moderates were split between six candidates.75
Similarly, in the 1996 Russian Presidential election, a communist candidate,
Gennadii Zyuganov, finished second to Boris Yeltsin by just a three percent
margin (thirty-two percent to thirty-five percent).76
Nonetheless, in the second round, the votes mostly move away from
the extremist to the moderate candidates and coalitions. 77 In all
abovementioned elections, the moderate candidates were able to harbor the
support of the backers of eliminated candidates and eventually win the
runoff. 78 Therefore, even though the runoff rule allows advancement of
extremist candidates to the second round, this system, unlike the plurality
rule, prevents the election of radical or anti-system candidates.79 For this
very reason, the runoff system is known for reducing political extremism.80
To date, no extremist candidate has made it to the second round in
Afghan presidential elections. Hamid Karzai, the winner of the 200481 and
2009 elections,82 Abdullah Abdullah, the runner up in 200983 and a frontrunner in the 2014 election,84 and Ashraf Ghani, the current president,85 have
all demonstrated moderate behavior and strong capabilities for building
cross-ethnic alliances. For example, in 2004 and 2009, in addition to
choosing his vice presidents from two different ethnic groups, Karzai was
able to make alliances with a large number of elites from different ethnic
groups.86 Abdullah’s tickets also represented three ethnic groups in both the
74

See id. at 5.
See id. at 6.
76
Norris, supra note 20, at 4.
77
Duverger, Which is the Best Electoral System?, in CHOOSING AN ELECTORAL SYSTEM: ISSUES
AND ALTERNATIVES 38 (Arend Lijphart & Bernard Grofman, eds., 1984); see also David Goldey & Philip
Williams, France, in DEMOCRACY AND ELECTIONS: ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND THEIR POLITICAL
CONSEQUENCES, 65–67 (Vernon Bogdanor & David Butler eds., 1983); Courtney, supra note 27, at 13;
Bordignon, supra note 19, at 1.
78
See LEWIS, supra note 21, at 5–6.
79
See Birch, supra note 61, at 325; Fabrice Lehoucq, Costa Rica: Modifying Majoritarianism with
40 per cent Threshold, in HANDBOOK OF ELECTORAL SYSTEM CHOICE 133 (Josep M. Colomer ed., 2004).
80
Bordignon, supra note 19, at 2; Courtney, supra note 27, at 14.
81
IEC 2004, supra note 60.
82
IEC 2009, supra note 60.
83
See id.
84
IEC 2014, supra note 60.
85
Id.
86
See Mobasher, supra note 3, 375, 378–9.
75
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2009 and 2014 presidential elections. 87 In addition to his tri-ethnic
presidential tickets, in both elections he officially established broad-based
coalitions comprised of elites and parties from diverse ethnic groups. 88
Similarly, Ghani’s presidential ticket represented an alliance of three groups:
a Pashtun, an Uzbek, and a Hazara.89 To include a Tajik representative at
the highest level of his government, he appointed Ahmad Zia Masoud as his
Special Envoy for Good Governance with the same level of authority and
benefits as his vice presidents.90
II.
THE RUNOFF CLAUSE
COALITIONS

AND THE

CONSOLIDATION

OF

CROSS-ETHNIC

While demonstrating the potential to encourage cross-ethnic alliances,
the runoff clause has remained an unwelcoming system for the
institutionalization of these coalitions.91 Many coalitions either dissolve or
reformulate during elections; some others split immediately after elections.92
Most of them are built on the basis of patronage and personal politics while
lacking titles, structures, and ideologies.93 Notably, their number is on the
rise, indicating a trend resembling party fragmentation in Afghanistan.
Table III. This table shows how many coalitions survived, partly
survived, reformulated, or ceased to exist before, during, and after
elections. The data is collected from a number of sources cited in the
footnote. 94 This table only includes some officially established
coalitions as well as some informal coalitions, which are large and
popular. Reformulation happens when coalitions renew their members,
titles, and objectives. Partly survived coalitions are the ones that a
number of elites or party members split.

87

See id. at 380–81, 402–05.
See id.
89
See id. at 407. In 2009, however, when Ghani was not a popular candidate, he appointed a
Pashtun, Mohammad Ayob Rafiqi, as his first vice president. See Ayob Aryan, Tarkib Mawenan
Namzedhai Intekhabat: Numad Kasrat Garayee? [The Composition of Vice-President Candidate: A Sign of
Pluralism?], BBC (Jun. 4, 2009), http://www.bbc.com/persian/afghanistan/2009/07/090630_a-af-electionvice-president-candidates.shtml.
90
Dr. Ghani even promised to amend the Constitution and appoint him as his third vice president.
See Ahmad Qureshi, Ghani promises to make Massoud 3rd VP, AFGHAN PAZHWAK NEWS (May 26, 2014),
http://www.elections.pajhwok.com/en/2014/05/26/ghani-promises-make-massoud-3rd-vp.
91
The runoff rule has also been associated with (i) being conducive to preference and information
revelation and (ii) ensuring a large mandate to the winner, thereby being more democratic. See Bouton,
supra note 29, at 284; see Blais, supra note 40, at 193–97; Courtney, supra note 27, at 13.
92
A good example of coalitions ceasing to exist after elections is Karzai’s team. After almost
fourteen years in office, Karzai no longer represents any coalition or party.
93
See Mobasher, supra note 3.
94
Supra note 52.
88
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Many studies suggest that the runoff system leads to party
fragmentation and multifactionalism.95 This system has a very complicated
relationship with coalition formation and consolidation. Despite theoretical
advances, the conventional literature does not adequately account for how
this system encourages the development of broad coalitions yet at the same
time those coalitions remain unstable and crumbling under this system.
Sartori, in his book Comparative Constitutional Engineering, posits that the
effects of the runoff rule on the development of parties and coalitions cannot
be predicted with any precision. 96 Damien Bol, André Blais, and their
colleagues called this complication a “mystery” of the runoff system. After
conducting some experimental elections under the runoff rule, they

95

See, e.g., V.O. KEY, SOUTHERN POLITICS, 420 (1949); Birch, supra note 61, at 324; Mainwaring &
Shugart, supra note 52, at 467; SHUGART & CAREY, supra note 42, at 213–214; Courtney, supra note 27, at
15; B.C. Canon, Factionalism in the South: A test of theory and a Revisitation of V.O. Key, 22 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 833, 845 (1978); Byron Criddle, Electoral Systems in France, 45 PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS 108, 109
(1992); Aurel Croissant & Philip Volkel, Party System Types and Party System Institutionalization:
Comparing New Democracies in East and Southeast Asia, 18 PARTY POLITICS 235, 255–256 (2012);
Stephen G. Wright & William H. Riker, Plurality and runoff systems and numbers of candidates, 60
PUBLIC CHOICE 155, 163 (1989).
96
SARTORI, supra note 63, at 67.
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emphasized that while this rule presumably should reduce the number of
candidates (parties and coalitions), in reality it does not.97
One explanation for this puzzle focuses on the first round of elections,
analyzing voting behaviors 98 in this round. 99 For instance, Maurice
Duverger,100 Garry Cox,101 William Riker,102 and César Martilini103 observe
that in the first round, the voters tend to vote sincerely since they have the
chance to make strategic decisions in the second round.104 This theory is
based on the assumption that candidates react to voters’ behavior, implying
that candidates make their entry decisions on the basis of the electoral
tendencies of voters.105 Since there are no (or few) bandwagon voters106
under the runoff system, more candidates are likely to run.107 In effect, the
runoff system discourages fewer candidates and the fusion of their

97

Damien Bol et al., Electoral System and Number of Candidates: Candidate Entry under Plurality
and Majority Runoff 20 (Paris School of Economics, Working Paper No. 2015-20, 2015),
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01168722/document.
A great number of scholars including Bol and Blais imply that the number of candidates is
equivalent to the number of parties or coalitions in presidential elections and so they focus their analysis on
the number of candidates. See id. at 1; Jakub Zielinski, Translating Social Cleavages into Party Systems:
The Significance of New Democracies, 54 WORLD POL., 184, 197–98 (2002); Wright, supra note 95, at 160,
176; Matt Golder, Presidential coattails and legislative fragmentation, 50 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 34, 34–48
(2006); Matthew Shugart & Rein Taagepera, Plurality Versus Majority Election of Presidents: A Proposal
for a “Double Complement Rule”, 27 COMP. POL. STUD. 323 (1994); Peter Buisseret, Entry Deterrence
Under Run-Off Rules 1(2015) (Working Paper); Courtney, supra note 27, at 15.
98
Voting behavior indicates an individual’s voting choices based on that person’s interests and
values as well as “judgment[s] about the various candidates’ chances of winning.” See André Blais et al.,
Strategic Vote Choice in One-round and Two-round Elections: An Experimental Study, 64 POL. RES. Q.
637, 637 (2011). If a voter casts her vote merely on the basis of her preference, it is called sincere voting.
However, if a voter casts her vote on the basis of the viability of a candidate, it is regarded as strategic
voting. Virtually, in every formal model the assumption is that the voter votes either sincerely or
strategically. See Fujiwara, supra note 25, at 198.
99
COX, supra note 54, at 124; Fujiwara, supra note 25, at 200 (FN 7); Bordignon, supra note 19, at
1.
100
DUVERGER, supra note 77, at 240.
101
COX, supra note 54, at 124.
102
William H. Riker, The Two-Party System and Duverger's Law: An Essay on the History of
Political Science, 76 AM. J. POL. SCI. REV. 753 (1982).
103
César Martinelli, Simple plurality versus plurality runoff with privately informed voters, 19 SOC.
CHOICE AND WELFARE 901 (2002).
104
See also Matthew Sobert Shugart & Scott Mainwaring, Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin
America: Rethinking the Terms of the Debate, in PRESIDENTIALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA
123 (Scott Mainwaring & Matthew Soberg Shugart eds., 1997); Thomas Piketty, Voting As
Communicating, 67 REV. OF ECON. STUD. 169, 169–191(2000).
105
See Fujiwara, supra note 25, at 199, 228; see also Bol, supra note 97, at 6; Van Der Straeten,
supra note 19, at 1–2.
106
“Bandwagon voter” as opposed to “sincere voter” refers to the voter who votes strategically,
deserting the preferred candidate in favor of a more viable one. See Fujiwara, supra note 25, at 202.
107
Duverger, supra note 77; Riker, supra note 102.
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supporters into larger coalitions.108 However, Afghan presidential elections
challenge this theory because the results of these elections have indicated
that the tendency for strategic voting 109 is considerably high among
voters.110
Indeed, all three Afghan presidential elections demonstrated that a
runoff system has as much of a bandwagon effect as a plurality system
does.111 For example, in the 2004 election, of the eighteen candidates, only
four dominated the polls, leaving their counterparts with less than one
percent of votes each.112 In 2009, the three leading candidates won almost
ninety-one percent of votes, letting the other twenty-nine candidates share
the rest. 113 Similarly, in the first round of the 2014 elections, the three
leading candidates won nearly eighty-eight percent, while the rest shared the
remaining twelve percent of votes. 114 The following table shows the
difference between the average votes of each leading candidate from those
of non-viable candidates in all three presidential elections.
Table IV. This table compares the average votes received by
leading candidates and those of the rest. The average votes are
calculated on the basis of election results produced on the Electoral
Commission website.115

108

A. LAWRENCE LOWELL, GOVERNMENTS AND PARTIES IN CONTINENTAL EUROPE, 110 (1896).
Gary Cox defines strategic voting as the electoral behavior that “rational voters eschew wasting
their votes on hopeless candidacies, preferring instead to transfer their support to some candidate with a
serious chance of winning.” See COX, supra note 54, at 30. According to Aron Kiss, “Strategic voting
occurs when an individual votes for an alternative that is not her most preferred one in the belief that this is
a better way to achieve the best realistically possible outcome in the election.” See Aron Kiss, Identifying
Strategic
Voting
in
Two-Round
Elections,
1
(2012)
(Working
Paper),
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0261379415001560.
Nonetheless, in a divided society, the viability of a candidate is not the only reason for voting
strategically as ethnic groups might tend to showcase their strength through voting strategically for one of
their own candidates, even though that candidate is less likely to win a nationwide election.
110
Mobasher, supra note 3, at 367–69.
111
“Bandwagon effect,” in an electoral context, refers to the situation where the electorates prefer to
vote for the most viable candidates in order to make their votes count. See Fujiwara, supra note 25, at 203.
112
See IEC 2004, supra note 60.
113
See IEC 2009, supra note 60.
114
See IEC 2014, supra note 60.
115
IEC 2004, supra note 60; IEC 2009, supra note 60; IEC 2014, supra note 60.
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On average, each leading candidate shared between 23% to 30% of
the votes, while the shares of deserted candidates ranged from 0.3% to 2.4%
in the last three presidential elections. This huge gap between the vote share
of leading candidates and others indicates that voters do vote strategically in
the first round. 116 This finding is consistent with the findings of some
scholars such as Laurent Bouton, 117 Gabriele Gratton, 118 Daniel Prinz, 119
Blais, 120 and Damien Bol, 121 who also dispelled the assumption of the
absence of strategic voting under the runoff system.122 André Blais and his
colleagues conducted an experiment comparing strategic voting under
plurality and runoff rules.123 Their experiment indicated that the voters had
as much incentive to vote strategically in a Two Round Election as in a One
Round Election.124 By this analysis, unstable coalitions are not the likely
consequence of the lack of strategic voting under the runoff system.125

116

This finding also challenges the conventional literature that strategic voting does not exist in
divided societies since voters follow the instructions of their elites and are likely to vote for their own
candidates. See Janet Landa et al., Ethnic Voting Patterns: A Case Study of Metropolitan Toronto, 14 POL.
GEOGRAPHY 435, 435 (1995); COX, supra note 54, at 15–16, 44, 83–85; MARTINE VAN BIJLERT, HOW TO
WIN AN AFGHAN ELECTION: PERCEPTIONS AND PRACTICES 2, 15 (2009); MOSER, supra note 70, at 24–25,
30 ; also see Robert G. Moser et al., Social Diversity Affects the Number of Parties Even under First-Pastthe-Post Rules, Am. Pol. Sci. Ass’n 2011 Ann. Meeting Paper (2011). This conventional understanding of
strategic voting did not account for the most likely situation in divided societies where voters engage in
intra-ethnic voting coordination and defection: they defect from one of their ethnic candidates in favor of
the another from the same group.
Mobasher, in his article Understanding Ethnic-Electoral Dynamics, has demonstrated that the
“tendency for the intra-ethnic [strategic voting] is considerably high among all ethnic groups and in all
Presidential elections . . . [E]thnic groups tend to vote collectively for their most viable candidates and
defect from the others. . . . This electoral behavior is very similar to strategic voting in consolidated
democracies where a left wing supporter is more likely to defect from a losing left candidate for a more
viable [left candidate] but is less likely to defect from a losing left wing candidate to vote for a right wing
candidate.” See Mobasher, supra note 3, at 368.
117
Bouton, supra note 27.
118
Id. at 283.
119
Daniel Prinz, Strategic Voting, Mixed and Runoff Elections: Evidence from Hungary, 4 (Mar. 30
2013)
(Working
Paper)
https://www.brown.edu/academics/economics/sites/brown.edu.academics.economics/files/uploads/Daniel%
20Prinz%20thesis.pdf.
120
Blais, supra note 67, at 278–86.
121
Bol et al., supra note 97, at 12.
122
Under the runoff rule, the voters have the incentive to vote strategically because they fear that
voting sincerely might result in two candidates in the second round that do not represent their interests and
preferences at all, or that a rival candidate wins the first round flat out. See id. at 7.
123
The purpose of Blais and his colleagues’ experiment was to determine whether voters behave
differently in the two voting systems, given the same set of options, and whether these behaviors yield
different outcomes as Duverger indicated. The same group of people voted in both elections. They had
exactly the same set of options: five candidates with the same positions. Blais and his colleagues
concluded that voters voted strategically under both electoral systems. See Blais, supra note 67, at 278–89.
124
See Blais, supra note 67, at 278–89.
125
Blais, supra note 40, at 193.
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Some scholars draw attention to the influence of the runoff system on
candidates’ strategies independent from voters’ behavior. 126 Blais and
Indridason criticize the literature for the lack of attention to candidates’
electoral strategies,127 since an electoral system influences not only voters’
behavior but also candidates’ and parties’ behavior.128 Indeed the candidates
(and their political allies) have more at stake in elections than voters, which
is winning or losing political power. Accordingly, candidates are more
invested in influencing the elections and alliances than voters. As such,
candidates’ strategies are more instrumental than voters’ strategies in
shaping parties and coalitions.129 Therefore, analyzing candidates’ coalitionbuilding strategies may better explain why the runoff system thwarts the
consolidation of coalitions.
Ensuring a possible second round, the runoff system provides enough
incentives for not one but three categories of candidates to enter the
competition: the first group is the “office seekers” who need to follow a
winning strategy of making alliances across ethnic groups. The largest
coalitions in the first round are formed by this category of candidates. The
second category of candidates that the runoff system encourages is what I
call “patronage-seekers” who enter the fray for some benefit other than
winning. These benefits include patronage for small parties and candidates,
especially if they win a considerable number of votes in the first round.130
Indeed, in Afghanistan, many candidates run to raise enough votes to
increase their political capital for bargaining with runner-ups in the second
round.131 The more votes they receive, the better bargaining power they gain
for patronage with front-running coalitions. Some candidates enter the race
only as spoilers, splitting the votes of viable candidates 132 for different
reasons, including forcing a second round election. 133 For these
opportunistic reasons, this category of candidates has little incentive to pull

126

See id.; Blais, supra note 67, at 280.
Blais, supra note 40, at 193.
128
Blais, supra note 67, at 280.
129
Blais, supra note 40, at 193.
130
Elgie, supra note 45, at 123.
131
BIJLERT, supra note 116, at 9. Some scholars found similar tendencies in candidates in other
countries. See SHUGART & CAREY, supra note 42, at 210, 225; Bol, supra note 97, at 22–23; Mark P.
Jones, Electoral Laws and the Effective Number of Candidates in Presidential Elections, 61 J. POLITICS
172, 176 (1999).
132
See BIJLERT, supra note 116, at 9. Some scholars found similar tendencies in candidates in other
countries. See COX, supra note 54, at 158; Mainwaring, supra note 52, at 467.
133
SHUGART & CAREY, supra note 42, at 216.
127
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out in favor of more viable candidates in the first round.134 Indeed, they
follow a blackmail strategy in the first round for more beneficial alliance
making in the second round.135 In that effort, they tend to form their own
coalitions and distinguishable constituencies, although their coalitions
remain informal, personalistic, and small.136
The third category of candidates that the runoff system incentivizes is
the “runoff-seekers.” 137 These are serious, but not necessarily the most
viable, candidates who run in the first round with a hope that they may be
able to finish as the runner up.138 Their strategy is forcing a second round
while finishing as a runner up.139 Finishing as a runner up allows them to
compete with the front-runner, having the chance of winning the alliance
and vote shares of the losing candidates.140 The success of the second place
candidate is more probable when a majority of voters dislike the top finisher,
or when, in a divided society, the top finisher is from a minority group,
assuming votes are ethnic-based. 141 Indeed, one of the reasons for
134

They tend to establish themselves as the main figures in their constituencies. See id. at 255; Bol,
supra note 97, at 23.
135
Mainwaring, supra note 52, at 467.
136
Most of these coalitions do not have any objectives other than competing in the elections. Many
are so small—merely the alliance of president and vice president candidates—that their formation remains
unknown to the media and public. As mentioned earlier, this study does not include those coalitions.
137
Here, runoff in the context of “runoff-seekers” means the second round. Therefore, runoff-seekers
are the candidates who would like to force a second round, in which they are one of the front-runners.
Thomas Fujiwara notes in his article, A Regression Discontinuity Test of Strategic Voting and
Duverger’s Law, that some parties and candidates enter the race in order to finish third. He, however, does
not explain why would a party or candidate would bear the cost of finishing third in an election, where only
two candidates can qualify in the second round. It seems to be his version of the interpretation of
Duverger’s hypothesis. See Fujiwara, supra note 25, at 215. Finishing third, however, does not seem to
benefit a candidate unless either a second round allows three candidates to compete or the candidate wants
to raise his political capital for bargaining against the front runners in the second round, which in that case
the candidate is categorized as opportunist in this article.
138
COX, supra note 54, at 158; SHUGART & CAREY, supra note 42, at 210; Mainwaring, supra note
52, at 467.
139
See Mainwaring, supra note 52, at 467.
140
SHUGART & CAREY, supra note 42, at 215–16.
141
See id. at 216.
In this situation, some also argue that political outsiders might gain the chance of prevailing over
the first round frontrunner. See Birch, supra note 63, at 325; SHUGART & CAREY, supra note 42, at 215.
Political outsiders are primarily referred to as candidates who distinguish themselves from party politics. It
is not, however, a clear-cut definition since some candidates might run as a party nominee but prefer to
establish themselves as political outsiders and are regarded as such by voters and politicians. A very recent
example of that is Donald Trump who, while running as a Republican in the 2016 presidential election in
the US, prefers to portray himself as an outsider. Political outsiders are likely to run a populist and antiestablishment campaign. See BUSCH, supra note 70, at 22–26, 154, 170–71.
There have been some cases where political outsiders became the eventual winner in the second
round. Twice in Peru, political outsiders were able to force a second round, in which they eventually won
against frontrunners. Also in Poland, a political outsider succeeded in his strategy of finishing second in
the first round, though he lost the second round to the top finisher. See SHUGART & CAREY, supra note 42,
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Abdullah’s lead of the candidates in 2014’s first round was the split of
Pashtun votes among seven different Pashtun candidates.142 A survey before
the second round of the 2014 election indicated that Ghani’s votes among
Pashtuns would increase from forty-nine percent in the first round to
seventy-five percent in the second round.143
The conventional literature failed to accurately predict the upper
bounds of parties and coalitions because they failed to account for one or
more of the categories of candidates and therefore under-predicted the
number of candidates. For instance, the formula M+1, which was suggested
by Garry Cox and other political scientists, falls short of predicting the upper
bounds of parties and coalitions in a runoff system because it does not
account for patronage-seeking candidates.144 In this formula, M refers to the
number of candidates that face off in the second round; 145 and so it is
hypothesized that the runoff system should reduce the number of candidates
to three parties in the long run.146 Predictably, this upper bound does not
even come close to reflecting the long lists of candidates that ran in the 2004
election (eighteen candidates), 147 the 2009 election (initially forty-four
candidates), 148 or the 2014 election (initially eleven candidates) 149 in
Afghanistan.150 Some recent studies examining the runoff rules in different
countries with longer experiences of runoff elections also indicated that the
at 33, 215. Encouraging a political outsider as a main contender is in itself a fragmenting characteristic of
the runoff rule, considering the fact that they join the contest as a new contender challenging the
established coalitions either as a leader of a new movement and alliance or as a populist independent. More
importantly, political outsiders have less experience and less ability to building coalitions in the assembly.
See id. at 22–33, 170–71, 215.
142
See Mobasher, supra note 3, at 384–85
143
The same survey also demonstrated that most supporters of losing candidates would vote for
Ghani in the second round. See Afghan’s Future Survey: Afghanistan’s Ethnic, Regional Divisions
Produce a Dead Heat in its Presidential Race, LANGER RESEARCH ASSOCIATES 1, 5 (2014),
http://www.langerresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/Afghanistan-Election_ACSOR-Langer.pdf.
144
M+1 is an extension of Duverger’s Law to the runoff system. M+1 indicates that eventually
strategic coordination would lead to first round elections, where one additional candidate would compete
with the M number of candidates—which is most often two candidates—that qualify for the second round
election. See COX, supra note 54, at 123; Shugart & Mainwaring, supra note 104, at 406; SHUGART &
CAREY, supra note 42, at 300; Wright, supra note 95, at 159–60.
145
See COX, supra note 54, at 123; Shugart & Mainwaring, supra note 104, at 406; SHUGART &
CAREY, supra note 42, at 300; Wright, supra note 95, at 159–60.
146
See COX, supra note 54, at 123–24; Shugart & Mainwaring supra note 104, at 406; Bouton, supra
note 29, at 283; Van Der Straeten, supra note 19, at 9.
147
IEC 2004, supra note 60.
148
The initial list of candidates for the 2009 presidential election is in KABUL PRESS,
http://kabulpress.org/my/IMG/pdf/presidential.pdf.
149
IEC 2014, supra note 60.
150
Some factors other than the electoral system might also affect the number of candidates. These
factors might include ballot access, open entry, filing fees, petition requirements, succession rules,
incumbency, local party strength, and fragmentation of parties. See Wright, supra note 95, at 165.
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runoff system is associated with far more than three candidates.151 In many
countries, the average number of runners under the runoff system is over
five candidates (coalitions).152
In addition, by ensuring the possibility of a second round election, the
runoff system postpones much of the bargaining and coalition building to the
second round.153 In fact, the runoff system invokes two rounds of coalitions:
proactive coalitions and second round coalitions.154 The proactive coalitions
form before the first round elections and the second round coalitions strike
when eliminated candidates join with the ones competing in a runoff.155 The
proactive coalitions are a combination of catchall (oversized) coalitions on
the part of serious candidates and fragmented coalitions on the part of
opportunist candidates. Hence, the first round elections experience a large
number of coalitions. Notably, the presence of a large number of coalitions
compels serious candidates to form oversized—and therefore less
cohesive—coalitions to win.156
The second round coalitions, which are common under runoff rules,
are even more disruptive to coalition consolidation in general because these
coalitions stem from the dissolving of proactive coalitions and the
reconfiguration of the others. 157 In these coalitions the losing alliances
regroup with front-running coalitions, which suggests that no coalition
remains intact within each presidential election.158

151

See Bol, supra note 97, at 20; Wright, supra note 95, at 161–62; Birch, supra note 63, at 323–24;
Mainwaring, supra note 52, at 467; SHUGART & CAREY, supra note 42, at 212–14; Courtney, supra note 27,
at 15; Croissant, supra note 95, at 255–56.
152
Wright, supra note 95, at 162.
153
See Kaare Strom, Ian Budge, & Michael J. Laver, Constraints on Cabinet Formation in
Parliamentary Democracies, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 303, 316 (May 1994); SHUGART & CAREY, supra note 42,
at 216; Linz, supra note 30, at 57.
154
SARTORI, supra note 63, at 166; Blais, supra note 40, at 194.
155
See Blais, supra note 40, at 193.
156
Afghan presidential elections have shown that serious candidates, in order to form a winning
coalition and neutralize the effects of multiplicity of candidates in their constituencies, make coalitions with
a variety of political groups and elites. For instance, in the presidential election of 2009, Karzai, in addition
to forming an alliance of parties and political groups, entered into bargains with a large number of elites
offering patronage. First, “he persuaded some strong Pashtun contenders such as Gul Agha Shirzai (then
governor of Nangarhar) and Anwar-ul-Haq Ahadi (the head of a Pashtun nationalist party) not to run
against him.” See Mobasher, supra note 3, at 378–79. “In the meantime, by introducing two prominent
Tajik and Hazara strongmen—Marshal Qasim Fahim and Karim Khalili— as his [running mates], Karzai
attempted to draw cross-ethnic votes.” Id. In addition, he made a coalition with Mohaqiq, the most
prominent leader of Hazaras, and Dostom, a well-known Uzbek leader. See id.
157
SARTORI, supra note 63, at 166; Blais, supra note 40, at 194.
158
Courtney, supra note 27, at 14; Bordignon, supra note 19, at 14; Resnick, supra note 52, at 739.
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The fact that runoff systems provide a secondary benefit for
candidates, which is normally patronage, leaves coalitions even more
vulnerable to instability. Patronage coalitions are not coalitions of
commitment 159 or permanent coalitions 160 but rather coalitions of
convenience161 where an alliance sustains as long as all parties benefit from
their coalescence. It is not surprising that immediately after the first round
of the 2014 election, the eliminated coalitions split into several factions so
that their members joined the second round contenders on their own terms.
This constant grouping and regrouping of alliances, which the runoff system
instigates, offers little chance of coalition solidification.162 The following
table illustrates how first round running mates split and eventually joined the
rival front-runners in the 2014 runoff.

159

Following Donald Horowitz’s taxonomy, a coalition of commitment is the one that is formed not
only to win elections and government power but also to implement a somehow coherent policy that is
ideologically shared by its members. See HOROWITZ, supra note 33, at 366.
160
A permanent coalition is the one that tends to survive even if it loses elections and government
power. See id.
161
Coalition in convenience is the one that is formed for a particular purpose, most often that of
winning elections and the government. See id.
162
Linz, supra note 62, at 22 (“The expectation of a runoff increases the incentive to compete in the
first round either in the hope of placing among the two most favored or of gaining bargaining power for
support in the runoff of one of the two leading contenders. Therefore, rather than favoring a coalescence of
parties behind a candidate, the system reinforces the existing fragmentation.”).
Adding to these issues, second round elections often encourage boycott by candidates and their
supporters. See Birch, supra note 63, at 326. For instance, in Serbia in 2002, the defeated candidates
boycotted the second round election, lowering the turnout by half. See OSCE/ODIHR Election
Observation Mission: Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, ORG. FOR SEC. AND COOPERATION EUROPE (Oct. 13, 2002), http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/serbia/15327?download=tr ue.
Also in Niger, in 2016, the opposition coalition with 17% of the vote dropped out of the runoff although the
candidate was running from behind the bar. See Opposition coalition to boycott Niger runoff poll,
ALJAZEERA (Mar. 9, 2016), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/03/opposition-coalition-boycott-nigerrunoff-poll-160309050119175.html.
Similarly, in Afghanistan, several candidates boycotted the presidential elections in 2004 and 2009.
See Colin Freeman, Afghan election fiasco as Karzai rivals pull out over fraud claims, TELEGRAPH (Oct.
10, 2004), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/Afghanistan/14 73809/Afghan-election-fiascoas-Karzai-rivals-pull-out-over-fraud-claims.html; See also Jon Boone, Afghanistan election challenger
Abdullah
Abdullah
pulls
out
of
runoff,
GUARDIAN
(Nov.
1,
2009),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/nov/01/afghan-election-karzai-abdullah.
In
multi-ethnic
Afghanistan, sometimes these electoral boycotts not only lead to electoral deadlock, but also tend to
instigate ethnic tensions. Boycott of the runoff elections by Dr. Abdullah in both 2009 and 2014 led to
ethnic tensions.
The runoff system has also been criticized for being costly and exhausting as well as responsible
for the lower turnout rates. See Lakeman, supra note 24, at 53; Courtney, supra note 27, at 14. It is costly
for both the government and voters, as well as for candidates. See LEWIS, supra note 21, at 2. Also, most
voters do not turnout in the second round, which leads to the winner gaining fewer votes than he had in the
first round. See Lakeman, supra note 24, at 53; LEWIS, supra note 21, at 2–3.
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Table V. This table illustrates losing candidates’ ticket splits in
the 2014 election before the second round.163

The table shows that from six presidential tickets, only two
collectively joined one of the two front-running coalitions; four other
presidential tickets split immediately after the first round, with some
members joining Abdullah’s campaign and others endorsing Ghani.164 The
presidential teams that withdrew early in the first round also split between
frontrunners. For example, Qayum Karzai endorsed Ghani while his first
running mate, Shahrani, supported Abdullah; somewhat similarly, while
163

The data was collected from a number of sources, including Alissa J. Rubin, Front-Runner in
Afghan
Election
Secures
a
Key
Ally,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
11,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/12/world/a
sia/abdullah-abdullah-afghanistan-presidential-electioncoalition.html; Sayed Tariq Majid, Ashraf Ghani, Ahmad Zia Find Common Ground, TOLONEWS (May 25,
2015), http://www.tolonews.com/en/ election-2014/14997-ashraf-ghani-ahmad-zia-find-common-ground;
Frud Bezhan, Afghan Election: Numbers Stacked Against Ashraf Ghani, RADIO FREE EUR. RADIO LIBERTY
(Jun. 3, 2014), http://www.rferl.org/content/afghan-election-ghani-numbers/25409182.html; Maria AbiHabib & Habib Khan Totakhil, Afghan Presidential Front-Runner Gets More Backing, WALL ST. J. (June
3, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/afghan-presidential-front-runner-gets-more-backing-1401812198;
Associated Foreign Press, Former warlord joins Abdullah in Afghan election, EXPRESS TRIBUNE (May 3,
2014),
http://tribune.com.pk/story/703684/former-warlord-joins-abdullah-in-afghan-election/;
Roya
Ibrahimi, Daoud Sultanzoy Endorses Ashraf Ghani, TOLONEWS (May 21, 2014),
http://www.tolonews.com/en /afghanistan/14936-daoud-sultanzoy-endorses-ashraf-ghani; Saleha Sadat,
Female Elites Back Abdullah, TOLONEWS (June 5, 2014), http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/15134female-elites-back-abdullah; Sonil Hidari, Arsala Endorses Ghani, TOLONEWS (June 9, 2014),
http://www.tolonews. com/en/afghanistan/15181-hedayat-amin-arsala-endorses-ghani-in-runoff.
164
Id.

June 2017

Electoral Choices, Ethnic Accommodations

439

Rahim Wardak stepped down without backing any candidate, his second
running mate embraced Ghani’s campaign.165
One major flaw that the runoff system has been charged with,
particularly in divided societies, is that it hinders smaller groups from
winning presidential office. 166 As to the case of Afghanistan, Kenneth
Katzman concluded that the “electoral system . . . strongly favors the
likelihood that the president will always be an ethnic Pashtun.”167 The three
presidential elections (2004, 2009, and 2014) in Afghanistan have led to
Pashtun candidates becoming presidents, although the results of the 2014
elections were too unsettled to confirm a legitimate winner. Indeed, in the
first round of the 2014 election, Abdullah, a Tajik candidate, was the frontrunner.168
The runoff system has also been criticized for being prone to ethnic
tensions and even political violence. For example, in countries such as
Angola (1992), Algeria (1992), Congo (1993), Macedonia (1994), Togo
(1994), and Haiti (1995), the losing candidates canceled the elections and
resorted to violence against the potential winners in the second round.169 To
this effect, some scholars argue that the runoff system creates a culture of
wait and see, where the losing parties might resort to violence. 170 In
Afghanistan too, the boycott of the runoff elections by Abdullah in both
2009 and 2014 led to ethnic tensions.171 Particularly in the 2014 runoff, the
ethnic tensions brought Afghanistan to the brink of a civil war.172 Therefore,
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Ghanizada, Qayum Karzai endorses Dr. Ashraf Ghani in election runoff, KHAAMA PRESS (June 8,
2014), http://www.khaama.com/qayum-karzai-endoses-dr-ashraf-ghani-in-election-runoff-8233; Saleha
Sadat,
Endorsements
Keep
Rolling
for
Abdullah,
TOLONEWS
(June
6,
2014),
http://elections.tolonews.com/node/4166; Ghanizada, Gen. Abdul Rahim Wardak withdraws from
presidential election, KHAAMA PRESS (Mar. 16, 2014), http://www.khaama.com/gen-abdul-rahim-wardakwithdraws-from-presidential-election-2884; Anwari, Sayed Hussain died in India because of cancer,
AFGHAN
BIOGRAPHIES
(July
6,
2016),
http://www.afghan-bios.info/index.php?option=com
_afghanbios&id=3475&task=view&total=3293&start=332&Itemid=2.
166
AREND LIJPHART, THINKING ABOUT DEMOCRACY: POWER SHARING AND MAJORITY RULE IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE 184, 186 (2008); STEIN ROKKAN, CITIZENS, ELECTION, PARTIES: APPROACHES TO
THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE PROCESSES OF DEVELOPMENT 157 (1970).
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two-round elections can have a serious potential for electoral boycott and
ethnic tensions.
III.

VARIATIONS, ALTERNATIVES, AND ANCILLARIES

Since the failure of the 2014 presidential election, efforts began to
reform the Constitution and electoral laws in order to put an end to ethnic
tensions that tend to ensue during and after elections. 173 However, the
ongoing legal and political discourse on reforming the electoral laws has
centered on changing only the parliamentary electoral system.174 This article
is the first attempt to extend the discourse to reforming the presidential
electoral rules, as presidential elections have failed to institutionalize crossethnic coalitions and prevent ethnic tensions.
Donald Horowitz, in his groundbreaking book Ethnic Groups in
Conflict, writes that under a proper electoral system, a presidential election
should be an optimal conflict-regulating institution for a divided society.175
He suggests that for a divided society, an electoral reform must be able to (a)
disrupt ethnic voting and parties, (b) induce moderation and ethnic
accommodation, (c) promote representation of minority groups, and (d)
encourage cross-ethnic coalitions. 176 Part II of this article emphatically
added that an electoral system must also help the consolidation of crossethnic coalitions.
Having exposed some failures of the runoff system in responding to
the abovementioned needs in Part II, here I explore a number of alternative
electoral designs, using the experiences of select countries that have adopted
those alternatives. In addition, in order to test how these alternative designs
173

The last three elections including the presidential elections of 2009 and 2014 as well as the
parliamentary election of 2010 instigated ethnic tensions. The runoff of the 2014 presidential election
almost brought about a civil war, if it was not for international intervention. See Int’l Crisis Group, supra
note 8, at 2; NDI, supra note 8, at 28; SMITH, supra note 8, at 3; Bezhan, supra note 8.
174
The two reports submitted by the Special Electoral Reform Commission to the government only
suggest reform of SNTV. See Farman 40, supra note 13; Farman 83, supra note 13. The commission
claims that the reports were produced after interviews and surveys with all interested parties such as voters,
MPs, civil society, political parties, and lawyers. See ELECTORAL REFORM: A REPORT ON THE STUDIES,
PERFORMANCE, RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SPECIAL ELECTORAL REFORM COMMISSION, 187–213
(Asadullah Sa’adati, ed., 2016). For articles about electoral reforms see ANNA LARSON & NOAH COBURN,
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REYNOLDS, supra note 28, at 6; LARSON, supra note 14, at 3; KATZMAN, supra note 12, at 5.
The few writings about the runoff rule in Afghanistan are merely for the description of the system
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apply to the Afghan political contest, I adopt a counterfactual simulation
model, replacing the existing majority runoff with alternatives—while
keeping all else the same—in the past three elections.177 Examining such
scenarios helps determine what would happen if the runoff system were
adjusted or replaced with an alternative system.178
Some examined reforms are merely adaptations of the runoff system
and others are alternative electoral designs. The attempt is to explain their
advantages and disadvantages in the context of Afghanistan, without
precisely recommending one over the other. 179 In fact, a combination of
some of these rules may work better than one in isolation.
A.

Adaptations of the Runoff System

Studying constitutions and electoral laws of countries illustrates that
the runoff system is no longer a rigid system with fixed features.
Lawmakers have found ways to manipulate different aspects of this system
in order to make it work properly in their societies in a given political
environment.
1.

Lowering the Threshold: Adopting a Qualified-Runoff

Lawmakers in some states have lowered the bar for winning the
election in the first round. For instance, Costa Rica and Nicaragua adopted a
177

The presidential election of 2002 in the Emergency Loya Jirga is not included in the analysis.
Perhaps one weakness of this model is that it may not be able to take into account all of the
variables and changes that might result from replacing a majority-runoff with an alternative. For example,
it is common knowledge that electoral systems have their own mechanical and psychological effects on
voters as well as candidates. See PIPPA NORRIS, ELECTORAL ENGINEERING: VOTING RULES AND POLITICAL
BEHAVIOR, 5–6 (2004); AREND LIJPHART, ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND PARTY SYSTEMS: A STUDY OF
TWENTY-SEVEN DEMOCRACIES, 1945–1990 (1994); William R. Clark & Matt Golder, Rehabilitating
Duverger’s Theory: Testing the Mechanical and Strategic Modifying Effects of Electoral Laws, 39 COMP.
POL. STUD 679, 679, 685, 694 (2006). Hence, Ghani and Abdullah’s’ votes, for example, might not have
been the same under different electoral systems, even though social cleavages played a determinant role.
But, coalition building and ethnic politics can be well predicted under this model. When necessary, these
shortcomings are highlighted in this part.
179
It bears mentioning that coalition institutionalization is a time-consuming process and a change in
electoral law does not instantaneously lead to party or coalition development. See Allen Hicken, Political
Engineering and Party Regulation in Southeast Asia, in POLITICAL PARTIES IN CONFLICT-PRONE
SOCIETIES: REGULATION, ENGINEERING AND DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT 80, 85 (Benjamin Reilly & Per
Nordlund, eds., 2008); Margit Tavits, The Development of Stable Party Support: Electoral Dynamics in
Post-Communist Europe, 49 AM. J. POL. SCI. 283, 283–98 (2005); Noam Lupu & Susan Stokes,
Democracy, Interrupted: Regime Change and Partisanship in Twentieth-Century Argentina, 29
ELECTORAL STUD. 91, 91 (2010); Fernando C. Bértoa, Party Systems and Cleavage Structures Revisited: A
Sociological Explanation of Party System Institutionalization in East Central Europe, 20 PARTY POLITICS
16, 18 (2012).
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threshold of forty percent for winning in the first round.180 In Argentina, the
threshold is forty-five percent.181
These runoff adaptations are referred to as qualified runoff, 182
qualified majority, 183 plurality with minimum threshold, 184 and nonmajoritarian runoff.185 Qualified majority is a variation of the runoff system
where states require a threshold below fifty percent for winning outright.186
If no candidate wins the required threshold, which is known as the threshold
of exclusion,187 the top two finishers compete in the second round to win the
election.188
A qualified-runoff might include a combination of (a) a threshold that
is less than fifty percent, and (b) a minimum gap of votes (usually ten
percent) between the top two finishers.189 For instance, the constitutions of
Argentina, 190 Bolivia, 191 and Ecuador 192 allow a candidate to become a
president if the candidate receives over forty percent of the vote with a lead
of more than ten percent of the vote over the second finisher. In Nicaragua,
a candidate can win with either forty percent or thirty-five percent of the
votes plus a margin of five percent more votes than the second finisher.193
By any of these measures, as Table VI indicates, none of the three
presidential elections in Afghanistan would have needed a second round
180

CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE COSTA RICA [CONSTITUTION OF COSTA RICA],
art.139 (Nov. 7, 1949); CONSTITUTION OF NICARAGUA, art. 147 (1) (Jan. 1, 1987).
181
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182
Qualified-runoff is a two-round electoral system which requires a threshold lower than absolute
majority (50%). See Norris, supra note 20, at 4; LEWIS, supra note 21, at 2–3.
183
Matthias Catón & Fernando Tuesta Soldevilla, Political Parties in Conflict-Prone Societies in
Latin America, in POLITICAL PARTIES IN CONFLICT-PRONE SOCIETIES: REGULATION, ENGINEERING AND
DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT 129 (Benjamin Reilly & Per Nordlund eds., 2008). However, Rachel Lewis
and her colleagues are skeptical about using the term majority for a threshold lower than 50%. They argue
that “[a] true majority requirement in fact means having to win more than half of the votes.” Hence, a forty
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184
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185
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186
Catón, supra note 183, at 129.
187
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candidate must obtain. See Douglas Rae et al., Thresholds of Representation and Thresholds of Exclusion:
An Analytic Note on Electoral Systems, 3 COMP. POL. STUD. 479, 480 (1971); Buisseret, supra note 97, at
1.
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166(1) (Feb. 7, 2009), https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Bolivia_2009.pdf.
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race. Assuming that the candidates received the same votes under a
qualified majority, in the 2004 and 2009 presidential elections, Karzai would
have still been the winner.194 In 2004, he scored a decisive 55.4% with a
margin of 39.1% from the second finisher.195 In 2009, he won 49.7% with a
gap of 19.1% from Abdullah. 196 In 2014, Abdullah would have been
declared the president with forty-five percent of votes and a difference of
13.4% from Ghani, who finished second.197 In this scenario, ethnic tensions
were less likely to happen in the 2009 and 2014 elections since the winning
candidates had the indisputable forty percent of votes in both elections.198
Table VI. This table illustrates the difference between the first
and second leading candidates in the 2004, 2009, and 2014
elections.199

A qualified runoff is a compromise between plurality and majoritarian
systems,200 and it seems to provide three advantages. First, it guards against
the main flaw of a plurality system, which is allowing candidates to win with
minority votes. 201 Second, like a plurality system, it encourages broad
coalitions.202 With a forty percent threshold, small parties and nonviable
candidates see a lesser chance of a second round taking place.203 Therefore
they would rather join winning coalitions than to enter the race.204 The more
the candidates and parties have incentives to strategically coordinate, the
higher the chances are for consolidation of coalitions. Peter Buisseret,
194

IEC 2004, supra note 60; IEC 2009, supra note 60.
IEC 2004, supra note 60.
196
IEC 2009, supra note 60.
197
IEC 2014, supra note 60.
198
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199
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200
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201
See Bouton, supra note 29, at 3; SHUGART & CAREY, supra note 42, at 217. Here, minority vote
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minorities.
202
See SHUGART & CAREY, supra note 42, at 217.
203
See id. at 210.
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195

444

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 26 NO. 3

analyzing qualified majority through a formal model, concluded that
qualified majority reduces party fragmentation as it only benefits major
parties. 205 Gabriel Negretto 206 and Fabrice Lehoucq 207 in their respective
studies of the qualified majority in Argentina and Costa Rica claimed that
this system was adopted by these nations to sustain a two party system.
Third, a lower threshold increases the chances for more than one
ethnic group to win the election. For instance, assuming the election results
remained the same, in the presidential election of 2014, Abdullah would
have been the first Tajik candidate declared as the president under a
qualified majority. His tally was forty-five percent, nearly fourteen percent
higher than the votes of the second finisher.208
There are some weaknesses associated with lowering thresholds,
however. Most importantly, the lower the bar, the less there is incentive for
forming cross-ethnic coalitions. It is likely under qualified runoff that
coalitions reduce to one or two ethnic groups, as candidates might see a
higher chance with forming a minimal coalition. Particularly, a forty percent
bar is lower than the estimated Pashtun population, which might encourage
some ethno-nationalists to rally their campaign around mainly mobilizing
Pashtun voters. Other ethnic groups are also able to form a winning
coalition with the coordination of mainly two or three groups.
The other issue with this adaptation is that it does not do away with
some shortcomings of the runoff system. Some opportunists and runoff
seekers with considerable support have even more incentives to attend the
contest. Grouping and regrouping of the coalitions might still exist, though
to a lesser extent, since the chances for serious candidates to win the election
in the first round are higher.
Some criticize lower-thresholds for decreasing the chances of a
Condorcet winner. 209 A Condorcet winner is the candidate who can win
against each of the other candidates if the election is held one-on-one
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between the candidates. 210 Most scholars concur that an election that
ensures the winning of a Condorcet candidate is the fairest of all, other
things being equal.211 However, one problem with Condorcet logic is that it
has not taken social diversity into account. Considering ethnic voting in
Afghanistan, Abdullah was simply a Condorcet loser to all seven candidates
in 2014. Hence, based on Condorcet logic, Abdullah and other minority
candidates will always remain losers as long as there is a candidate from the
largest group. However, there is a serious question about the fairness of an
electoral system if some groups are permanent losers under that system;212
more importantly, a system cannot lead to a stable democracy unless it
includes and satisfies all major social forces.213
Another criticism against the forty percent threshold advanced by
Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Shugart is that under this system a candidate
might win with a questionable margin of difference. 214 For example, a
candidate may win with forty-five percent of the vote against forty-four
percent for the runner-up.215 This criticism is warranted in cases where the
threshold of distance between the votes of the first and the second finisher is
not accounted for. However, this criticism does not have merit in cases
where, in addition to winning forty percent of the vote, the first finisher must
win at least ten percent more of the vote than the second finisher.
Additionally, marginal difference of votes is possible under any electoral
system. For instance, fifty-one percent versus forty-nine percent under a
majority runoff system or thirty-four percent versus thirty-three percent
under a plurality are possible but conventionally satisfying outcomes to
recognize the winners.
210
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Constituency Pooling

One way to promote cross-ethnic coalitions would be to oblige the
presidential candidates to garner a certain level of support across different
regions.216 Drawing support simultaneously from across different regions,
which are geographically non-contiguous, is called constituency pooling.217
Some countries have adopted such an electoral system, which requires that
in order to win an election, a candidate has to receive votes from different
regions inhabited by different ethnic groups.218 For instance, in Indonesia, a
candidate can win an election by receiving not only an absolute majority of
votes nationwide but also at least twenty percent of votes in half of all
provinces. 219 Similarly, in Kenya, a winning candidate, in addition to
winning majority votes nationwide, has to garner twenty-five percent of the
votes in more than half of the counties.220
Another variation of constituency pooling is concurrent pluralities.221
This involves a plurality system, in which a presidential candidate must win
pluralities concurrently in several regions of the country.222 The concurrent
pluralities system is the invention of Nigerian Constitution makers. 223
According to this system, in addition to winning a nationwide plurality, a
presidential candidate must win a minimum of twenty-five percent of votes
in at least two-thirds of the states. 224 If no candidate meets these
requirements, only two candidates from the first round compete in the
second round. 225 Since states are drawn mainly along ethnic lines, 226 the
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first round election automatically requires candidates to make broader
coalitions in order to appeal to voters across ethnic lines.227
This vote-pooling 228 formula works best when ethnic groups are
territorially recognizable; 229 therefore, it is an ideal rule for Afghanistan,
which has geographically concentrated ethnic groups.230 Given the regional
concentration of ethnic groups, Article 45 of the Election Law seems to have
somewhat of a vote-pooling effect. This article requires presidential
nominees to collect signatures of “one hundred thousand voters, from a
minimum of twenty provinces, two percent from each province.” 231 On the
surface, this threshold of nomination seems to suggest that presidential
nominees need support from more than one ethnic group in order to qualify
for candidacy. In reality, however, this threshold is much too low to have a
constituency-pooling effect. It appears weaker in scope and scale than the
vote-pooling rule in Nigeria and Indonesia. In fact, this threshold of
nomination may be criticized for favoring only the two largest ethnic groups
in Afghanistan. Pashtuns and Tajiks are the only ethnic groups that are
estimated to have a minimum of two percent population in at least twenty
provinces of Afghanistan.232 The next two largest ethnic groups, Hazaras
and Uzbeks, are present in fewer than fifteen provinces.233 Therefore, while
having little vote-pooling effect, this threshold seems to qualify candidates
from only the two largest ethnic groups. In the 2004 and 2009 presidential
elections, when this threshold did not exist, there were some Uzbek and
Hazara candidates who eventually won a large number of votes.234 After the
adoption of this rule, however, the candidates in the 2014 presidential
election were exclusively Pashtuns and a Tajiks.235
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The Legislative-Runoff236

Many scholars argue that one of disadvantages of a presidential
constitution is its susceptibility to political deadlock, which results from the
confrontation of the president and the legislature. 237 Lawmakers in some
countries have tried to get around this issue by requiring the second round to
take place in the legislature, 238 which resembles a key feature of
parliamentarism.239 In other words, in these countries, if no candidate were
to win an absolute majority in the first popular election, the top two or three
candidates would have to compete for majority votes in the legislature.240
Chile before 1973 and Bolivia (1967-2009) were among the few countries
that adopted this system in their constitutions.241
In Bolivia, if no candidate could win an absolute majority in the first
round election, the congress had to elect from the top two finishers.242 This
system encouraged permanent coalitions in Bolivia, as the legislative parties
earned due influence in government formation.243 Edward Gamarra argues
that after the adoption of this system, the “Bolivian politicians appeared to
have achieved an equilibrium that could not have existed were the system
purely presidential, especially if the president were elected by a majority
runoff.” 244 Three broad coalitions were formed in Bolivia 245 as
parliamentarians showed political maturity by entering into long-term
pacts.246 Shugart and Carey argue that a purely presidential constitution in
Bolivia would not have been capable of holding these coalitions together.247
Some scholars referred to the Bolivian political system as a hybrid
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presidential system248 for the reason that the president was elected by the
legislature in the second round.249
The parliamentary election of presidents offers some advantages that
neither purely presidential nor parliamentary systems can offer. 250 One
advantage of a legislative runoff election is that it reduces the number of
candidates by discouraging opportunist candidates and blackmailing
coalitions. This is primarily because the front-runners no longer need the
support of different constituencies in order to win the second round; hence,
the opportunists have nothing to offer for bargaining. Besides, once
coalitions are established, political outsiders have little chance to win the
second round in the parliament and so they have little incentive to run.251
Consequently, this system impedes fragmentation and regrouping of
coalitions in the second round. Moreover, while the executive power
originates from parliament, it does not depend on the parliamentary vote of
confidence for its survival. 252 This ensures that the stability of the
government is not put at risk, which is the case in fragmented parliamentary
systems.253
Nonetheless, legislative-runoff systems have some downfalls that
need to be highlighted. For instance, this system has a strong potential to
encourage electoral corruption. Candidates may find it easier and even
cheaper to buy MPs rather than trying to build coalitions with them based on
some policy platform. Hence, it encourages patronage-based coalitions.
Some studies have shown that political coalitions in Bolivia, for instance,
were more driven by access to patronage than by policy platforms. 254 MPs
made a coalition to elect the president, but once the president was elected,
the coalition weakened.255 Furthermore, some suggested that since after the
election the president was not dependent on a parliamentary vote of
confidence, presidents were less likely to stay loyal to coalitions.256 These
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issues were perhaps the reason that the legislative-runoff was replaced with
the direct runoff system in the new constitution of Bolivia.257
There is also a chance that in the legislature the second-place finisher
wins the election.258 This might lead to some tensions since the candidate
with the popular vote might raise the issue of legitimacy against the
candidate with the legislative majority. It becomes more problematic if
votes are cast on ethnic bases in the parliament, considering the fact that
ethnic voting is more visible in the legislature.
In addition, the development of cross-ethnic coalitions is not insured
under this system since building a minimal coalition is possible due to the
presence of perfect information about the ethnic composition of the
parliament. Knowing the number of ethnic representatives in the parliament,
candidates may establish a minimum coalition of two or three groups, while
excluding others. The following table shows the possibility of several
minimal coalitions, using the current composition of Wolesi Jirga.259
Table VII. This table illustrates the possibility of minimal,
oversized and grand coalitions, considering the current
composition of Wolesi Jirga.260

It shows that four minimal winning coalitions are possible where
some major ethnic groups are excluded. Similarly, the exclusion of at least
one ethnic group is possible under three oversized coalitions under the
257

CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO [BOLIVIA’S CONSTITUTION OF (PLURINATIONAL) STATE] art.
166(1) (Feb. 7, 2009), https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Bolivia_2009.pdf.
258
For example, in Chile in 1925 the second-place candidate in the parliament outran the first-round
frontrunner. See SHUGART & CAREY, supra note 42, at 85.
259
Andrew Wilder, A House Divided? Analyzing The 2005 Afghan Elections, AFGHANISTAN
RESEARCH AND EVALUATION UNIT (2005), http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/47c3f3c01b.pdf; Winning
Candidate’s List, INDEPENDENT ELECTION COMMISSION OF AFGHANISTAN, http://www.iec.org.af
[hereinafter IEC List].
260
Wilder, supra note 259; IEC List, supra note 259.

June 2017

Electoral Choices, Ethnic Accommodations

451

legislative-runoff system. Even these oversized coalitions are costeffectively less desirable since these coalitions lead to further distribution of
power (cabinet seats).261 One factor that is likely to balance this flaw of the
legislative-runoff system is the formation of proactive coalitions. Since
serious candidates want to win in the first round outright, they tend to form
pre-electoral coalitions, which are cross-ethnic. In effect, these proactive
coalitions are likely to cut across ethnic lines in the parliament, should a
second round take place.
B.

Alternative Electoral Designs
1.

Alternative Vote

One alternative to the runoff system that the reformers should
consider for the presidential election is Alternative Vote (AV). This
electoral system is also called Preference Voting, 262 Preferential Voting
System, 263 Ranked Choice Voting (RCV), 264 and Instant Runoff Voting
(IRV). 265 Under an AV system voters rank candidates in order of their
preferences by putting one, two, etc., beside each candidate’s name.266 It is a
majoritarian system267 since the winning candidate must be able to secure an
absolute majority.268 If no candidate wins over fifty percent of the votes, the
candidates with the lowest number of votes are eliminated and their ballots
are redistributed to the candidates who were ranked second to the eliminated
261

A minimum winning coalition is optimal when parties want to form a coalition, which helps them
win the election but no more. An oversized coalition is greater than necessary for winning. A grand
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in
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262
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ones. 269 This process continues until a candidate wins the majority. 270
Surplus Vote (SV) is a cousin (or a subtype) of AV, in which all candidates
except for the top two finishers are eliminated at once.271 Then the votes of
the eliminated candidates are distributed to the top two finishers based on
the next preferences of the voters.272 This system is used for presidential
elections in Sri Lanka 273 and mayoral elections in London. 274 The
Constitution of Sri Lanka restricted the voters’ choices to three
candidates,275 while in London the voters can choose only two candidates.276
Considering the presidential election of 2014 in Afghanistan, using
SV could have led to any outcome. Indeed, a poll by Langer Research
Associates indicated that Ghani was the second choice for twenty-one
percent of respondents while Abdullah was the second choice for twelve
percent.277 If we add these numbers to the actual number of the votes that
Ghani and Abdullah won in the first round, Abdullah would have been the
president with nearly fifty-seven percent of the votes. However, considering
only the first and the second choices of the respondents, Ashraf Ghani would
have been the president with fifty-seven percent, since thirty-six percent of
respondents—including unlikely voters—replied that they would cast their
first choice for Ghani compared to forty percent of respondents whose first
choice was Abdullah.278 In fact, using SV in 2014 would have led to fewer
candidates in the first place. Under this change, not only would Ghani and
Abdullah have a different number of votes, the coalitions would also have
been fewer and less susceptible to patronage bargaining and dissolution.
AV has similarities to both plurality and runoff rules. Some argue
that it is designed to remedy the flaws of plurality and runoff systems while
keeping their advantages intact.279 It is similar to plurality systems in the
269
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sense that it is only a one-round election.280 Therefore, it has the advantage
of plurality systems, which is allowing only serious candidates to run in the
election. Opportunist candidates see fewer benefits to running and
obviously there is no space for runoff seekers. This way, both plurality and
AV systems reduce the number of candidates, which in turn leads to broader
and stronger coalitions. However, unlike plurality systems, an AV system
does not allow a candidate with a small number of votes to win elections.281
This difference indeed gives AV an edge over the plurality system.282
AV, and particularly SV, is similar to the runoff system in the fact that
they both prevent candidates from being elected with only a minority vote.283
As such, both systems make it impossible for a single ethnic coalition in
Afghanistan to win an election. Therefore, like the runoff system, AV offers
the advantage of encouraging cross-ethnic coalitions. 284 Both systems
require voters to have more than one preference, if their first choice does not
win. 285 And the AV system, like the runoff system, tends to shift the
preferences from extremist candidates to moderate ones. 286 Nonetheless,
unlike runoff systems, AV allows voters to make all of their choices in a
single ballot, as opposed to requiring a second-round election.287 To this
effect, the AV system bars coalition fragmentation and regrouping that are
the normal course of coalition-making under the runoff system.
Furthermore, the AV system has an edge over plurality and runoff
rules in the fact that it gives more choices to the voters. As Reilly posits,
this system allows voters to reconcile their two conflicting aims: “the need
to vote for their own ‘local’ ethnic candidate . . . and the desire to vote, using
secondary preferences, for the candidate [with merits].” 288
More
importantly, the AV system not only makes the candidates dependent on
cross-ethnic votes, 289 it also encourages vote-pooling among voters. 290
280
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However, the vote-pooling effect of AV is conditioned by an ethnic
distribution, where no ethnic group exceeds fifty percent of the
population. 291 By most estimations, ethnic distribution in Afghanistan
perfectly meets this condition.292
Nevertheless, some scholars have criticized AV by identifying some
of its main shortcomings. They have been particularly skeptical about the
adoption of the AV system in countries with a lower level of literacy,293
which surely includes Afghanistan.294 Among other things, they argue that
for some voters, making several preferences and ranking candidates
accordingly is not an easy task. 295 Also, the complexity of the tallying
process might make the politicized but uneducated voters doubt the
results.296 Furthermore, some suggest that the AV system, like the runoff
system, gives edges for larger groups over smaller groups since larger
groups have more chances of winning inter-communal preferences.297 Also,
intra-communal ranking of candidates is likely to favor larger ethnic groups.
For example, AV in the 2000 presidential elections of Republika Srpska,
favored a hardline Serb candidate because the Bosnian voters cast their
second preferences to minor Bosnian parties rather than voting for moderate
Serb candidates.298
One other issue with the AV system is that voters are likely to plump
(cast all) 299 their votes for a single candidate rather than making a number of
choices.300 This tendency effectively turns the AV system into a plurality
290
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system.301 Making further choices compulsory is also problematic since it
would encourage voters to make uncalculated and random choices that may
affect the result very badly. 302 Or take the case of the 2014 Afghan
elections, in which under an AV rule, all Tajik voters would have had to cast
their second and third preferences for a Pashtun candidate since there was
only one Tajik candidate. Pashtun voters, however, could cast their second
and third preferences for several other Pashtun candidates.
Here,
compulsory ranking gives an undue privilege to one ethnic group over the
other.
2.

Proportional Presidency

Linz criticizes presidential elections for being zero-sum games, where
the winner wins the office and the losers have to step aside with empty
hands. 303 This feature of presidential elections becomes particularly
problematic when candidates from a single group win the election every
time.304 This leads to frustrations in other ethnic groups,305 which in turn
hinders depoliticization of ethnic identities.306
With only three presidential elections passing,307 the frustrations have
already grown among different ethnic groups as Pashtun candidates have
consistently won the office.308 These concerns have been reflected in the
writings of Kenneth Katzman, who posited that the “electoral system . . .
strongly favors the likelihood that the president will always be an ethnic
Pashtun.” 309 Indeed, one main reason for proposing a parliamentary and
semi-presidential system instead of a presidential constitution by the
Northern Alliance, an alliance of mainly Tajik, Hazara, and Uzbek parties,310
301
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is that smaller ethnic groups want to make the highest executive office
accessible to their candidates. 311 Constitution designers in different
countries have tried different paths to ensure that major ethnic groups are
entrusted with the government. For example, Switzerland’s Constitution
introduced collegial presidentialism,312 which is a federal council of seven
members where the presidency is rotated annually among its members. 313
This collegial executive was created to reflect the socio-political
heterogeneity of Switzerland at the highest level of government. 314 A
similar system was tried twice in Uruguay but did not work.315
In order to deal with the problem of winner-take-all, here I propose
proportional presidency. Proportional presidency enables the top two
finishers to share the same presidential term, although with their own
administrations in a sequence. I call it proportional presidency since the
span of each presidents’ administration must be proportional to the votes
s/he receives. In order to have an optimal outcome, this system must have
certain characteristics. First, under this system, one presidential term should
be at least eight years to allow each administration to have a life span of at
least three years. Second, a presidential term should be equal to two
parliamentary terms, allowing concurrent elections after each presidential
term. Third, the life span of each administration should be proportional to
the votes each president receives, provided that each administration should
have a duration of at least three years. Fourth, if the vote share of the second
finisher falls short of acquiring him/her three years of presidency, the first
finisher gets to be the president for a full parliamentary term, after which
another concurrent election should be held. Fifth, the president with a
higher percentage of votes runs the first administration and the one with a
lower percentage of votes runs the second. With these characteristics, a
proportional presidency would have led to a single round of election in 2014
in Afghanistan. Under an eight year presidential term, Abdullah Abdullah
would have taken the office for 4.7 years, proportional to his forty-five
311
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percent win of the vote. Subsequently, Ashraf Ghani would have been the
president for 3.3 years (See Table VIII). Electoral fraud and ethnic tension
would have been less likely since all stakeholders would have been sure
about the presidency of their candidates.
Table VIII: This Table shows the duration of Abdullah and
Ghani’s presidencies (compared to their votes) under an eight
year proportional presidency.

The proportional presidency I propose here is different from collegial
presidentialism.316 In Switzerland, there is a council of seven-members who
rotationally lead the country as the president every year. 317 Proportionality
in collegial presidentialism indicates that the number of the presidents is
proportional to the social cleavages and respective political parties. 318 In
proportional presidency, however, proportionality determines the longevity
of each administration by the share of votes that each president wins.
Proportional presidency is also different from co-presidency, which was
implemented to some extent in Cyprus (1960–1963). 319 Under a copresidency, as proposed by Shugart and Carey, the president and vice
president are elected on the same ticket by voters.320 They form the same
administration, although they represent different ethnic groups and clearly
have equal powers.321 Proportional presidency, however, suggests separate
administrations on the basis of the vote shares of two presidential candidates
who have their own vice president nominees. This way, proportional
presidency avoids cohabitation 322 that exists in co-presidency, as Shugart
and Carey willingly admit.323
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Proportional presidency has some pros and cons, like all other
alternatives.324 The major advantage of proportional presidency is the fact
that it properly responds to the frustration of ethnic groups by allowing their
candidates to possibly run the administration in different presidential terms.
Knowing their candidates can win elections, voters have little incentive to
stay in their ethnic box and elites have little justification to mobilize their
ethnic groups. 325 However, this advantage does not equally apply to all
ethnic groups; for instance, Hazaras, Uzbeks, and other minorities still have
little chance to win elections.326
One criticism against this system would be the discontinuity of
administrations. An incumbent coalition is eventually replaced by an
opposition coalition, which may undo all of (or most of) its policies. In
addition, a concurrent election may help one administration obtain a
majority in the parliament, but not the other. Therefore, political deadlock is
always a possibility under this system. A viable solution to this problem is
slate-proportional presidency, where each coalition introduces a slate of two
presidential candidates rather than a single candidate. The voters first vote
for a slate of candidates and then for individual candidates within each slate.
This way, although candidates’ votes determine the length of their
presidencies, both presidents will be from the same coalition. Since both
presidents presumably follow the same political agenda, there is no need for
the minimum threshold of three years of presidency for the second president.
Even the presidential term can be reduced to merely four to five years.
Including two vice presidents in the slate will allow each presidential
ticket to represent all four large ethnic groups. Allowing the two vice
presidents to remain in the office for a full presidential term, regardless of
president alternations, has three positive outcomes. First, they will help with
the continuity of policy implementation when the new president comes to
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office. Second, the supporters of vice presidents are likely to cast meritbased votes when their vice-president candidates are members of the slate
rather than nominees of individual candidates. Third, the ethnic groups with
vice president representatives will be satisfied with the fact that although
their representatives in the executive do not have as much power as the
presidents, their endurance in office is longer than that of the presidents.
This is important because designing a system that includes only two ethnic
groups is likely to alienate the two other ethnic groups, who are not likely to
approve the system.327
A somewhat similar experience to slate-proportional presidency can
be seen in Mauritius. In this country, one executive term was divided
equally between two prime ministers, although through an agreement
between the coalition partners rather than through some constitutional
provisions.328 Thanks to this agreement, for the first time in Mauritius, an
elite from a minority group—a non-Hindu—was able to become the prime
minister.329 Colombia is another country that followed a similar approach.
In 1958, in order to put an end to the civil war, the two dominant parties of
Colombia agreed on a consociational form of government. 330 Under this
consociational arrangement, they rotated the presidency every four years and
split seats in the Congress as well as in other government agencies evenly
for over sixteen years. 331 Nonetheless, one major difference between these
arrangements and the slate-proportional presidency is that the latter is a
constitutional design and not a temporary arrangement between rival parties.
In effect, the latter is likely to generate incentives for long-lasting coalitions.
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CONCLUSION
This article is the first attempt to study the merits of the runoff system
under Article 61 in relation to the formation and consolidation of coalitions
in Afghanistan. It comports with most studies that associate the runoff
system with the formation of broad-based coalitions. 332 It also holds the
somewhat conventional view that given the ethnic distribution in
Afghanistan, the runoff clause, with a fifty percent threshold, has been
instrumental to the development of cross-ethnic coalitions in all three
presidential elections.
This article, however, departs from the conventional wisdom in
several important respects. Most importantly, it suggests that the formation
of coalitions does not necessarily imply the survival of coalitions. To this
effect, it observes that while encouraging the formation of cross-ethnic
coalitions, the runoff system has consistently hindered the perpetuation of
these coalitions. It reveals that by ensuring a second round, the runoff
system turns the first round into an investment juncture for patronage and
runoff seeker elites, who would eventually bargain with (or in the case of
runoff seekers, challenge) a front-runner in the second round. These
candidates have formed their own small and large alliances in the first round
and then joined the front-running coalitions in the second round, apparently
after some serious patronage bargaining. What this suggests is that under
the runoff system no coalition remains intact, neither in structure nor in
policy. This process of coalition formation, dissolving, and reconfiguration
under the runoff system has been an obstacle to the consolidation of
coalitions.
This article timely engages with the recent efforts on reforming the
Constitution and electoral laws in Afghanistan. Since the failure of the 2014
presidential election, these efforts escalated in order to put an end to ethnic
tensions that have tended to ensue during and after Afghan elections. 333
However, the ongoing legal and political discourse on reforming the
electoral laws has centered on changing only the parliamentary electoral
system.334 By revealing some inherent flaws with the runoff system, this
332
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article suggests that Article 61 of the Constitution needs to be revisited. For
this very reason, Part III examined some alternative electoral designs. These
designs included qualified runoff, legislative runoff, constituency pooling,
an AV system, and proportional presidency. The observation of these
institutional designs indicates that they are likely to remedy some of the
negative impacts of the current majority runoff system on coalition building
and electoral politics. As such, these alternative designs are more likely than
the runoff system to encourage the consolidation of cross-ethnic coalitions.
In addition, these designs are likely to reduce ethnic tensions in Afghanistan.
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